

SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES

AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

Volume 17, No. 1

Articles

- Quaid-i-Azam and Rajgopalachari Formula.
Muhammad Iqbal Chawla
- Quaid-i-Azam from the Nationalist Muslim to the Muslim Nationalist.
Amna Mahmood
- Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as the First Governor General of Pakistan.
Iqtidar Karamet Cheema
- Basic Sources and Documents of the Freedom Struggle of Muslims of India under the leadership of the Quaid-i-Azam.
Sarfraz Hussain Mirza
- **Book Review**
- **Statements**
- **Select Bibliography**
- **Chronology**
- **Pearls of Wisdom**
- **Messages of Quaid-i-Azam**
- **Tributes to Quaid-i-Azam**

JANUARY 2002

QUAID-I-AZAM NUMBER

SOUTH ASIA STUDIES

Rafique Ahmad

Editor

South Asian Studies seeks to provide a forum for discussion of issues and problems primarily relating to South Asia. We welcome contributions by researchers, administrators, policy makers and all other interested in promoting better understanding of South Asian affairs.

Published bi-annually by the Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Quaid-i-Azam Campus, Lahore, Pakistan.

Views expressed in the *South Asian Studies* do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre or the Editors. Responsibility for the accuracy of facts and for the opinions expressed rests solely with the authors.

Copy Right ©

Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza

Managing Editor

Maskeen Ali Hijazi
Syed Abid Hussain Bukhari

Literary Editors (Honorary)

Subscription Rates

Pakistan	:	Annual	Rs. 175.00	By Air Mail
		Single Copy	Rs. 100.00	
Foreign	:	Annual	U.S. \$ 70.00	By Air Mail
		Single Copy	U.S. \$ 36.00	
Pakistan	:	Annual	Rs. 165.00	By Surface Mail
		Single Copy	Rs. 95.00	
Foreign	:	Annual	U.S. \$ 65.00	By Surface Mail
		Single Copy	U.S. \$ 33.00	

Correspondence

All correspondence should be directed to the Managing Editor, *South Asian Studies*, Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Quaid-i-Azam Campus, Lahore, Pakistan.

ISSN 1026 – 678 X

SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES

Volume 17, No. 1
JANUARY 2002
(Quaid's Number)



Centre for South Asian Studies
UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB
QUAID-I-AZAM CAMPUS, LAHORE
PAKISTAN

SOUTH
ASIAN
STUDIES



SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES

Volume 17, No. 1

(Quaid-i-Azam Number)

January 2002

Articles

- | | | |
|------------------------|-----|--|
| Muhammad Iqbal Chawla | 1 | Quaid-i-Azam and Rajgopalachari Formula |
| Amna Mahmood | 17 | Quaid-i-Azam from the Nationalist Muslim to the Muslim Nationalist |
| Iqtidar Karamet Cheema | 35 | Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as the First Governor General of Pakistan |
| Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza | 53 | Basic Sources and Documents of the Freedom Struggle of Muslims of India under the leadership of the Quaid-i-Azam |
| | 75 | Book Review |
| | 77 | Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah - Statements |
| | 93 | A Select Bibliography
(Some Rare Books on the Quaid-1945-2000) |
| | 101 | Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah - 1876 to 1948
(A Chronology) |
| | 109 | Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah : <i>earlys of Wisdom</i> |
| | 117 | Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam |
| | 119 | Tributes to Quaid-i-Azam |

Quaid-i-Azam and Rajgopalachari Formula

MUHAMMAD IQBAL CHAWLA

Abstract

Rajgopalachari submitted a formula to Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1944, in which he accepted, in principle, the division of India on the basis of two-nation theory. He proposed that the provinces of Bengal and the Punjab should also be divided on the same communal grounds. Accordingly, such districts were to be included in Pakistan where Muslims formed majority. Quaid rejected it as it offered him a mutilated, truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan. The British government, however, partitioned the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent more or less according to the Rajgopalachari formula. Therefore this article attempts to discuss the nature and character of the plan, and reaction of Quaid-i-Azam to the plan.

In 1930's the All India National Congress Party adopted an authoritarian and aggressive attitude towards the Muslims and the British. It aimed at the British expulsion from India through revolutionary, but ostensibly non-violent methods with the ultimate aim to establish Hindu Raj.¹ Gandhi, who commanded respect from the Hindus controlled the affairs of the Congress Party, almost single-handedly.² His peculiar appeal to the Hindu veneration for the ascetic helped him to become the unquestioned dictator of the Congress which was largest, best financed and most rigid Hindu organization, though it claimed to be secular and also having very minor representation of different religions, in India.³ In the provincial elections of 1937 the Congress Party secured 711 out of 1585 seats. This was even less than majority, but it was enough to give the party an absolute majority in five provincial legislatures and control in three others.⁴ These unexpected results intoxicated the Congress leaders with a sense of newfound power. Overriding and ignoring the growing intensity of the Muslim League's opposition to their anti-Muslim policies,⁵ they began to believe that they were most deserving candidates to rule over India, after the departure of the British.⁶ After having occupied the provincial governments authoritatively, they started thinking of capturing the Center also as early as possible. But the World War II shattered their dreams.

Muhammad Iqbal Chawla, Assistant Professor, Department of History, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

The Congress resigned from their ministries on the eve of the Second World War in 1939, owing to non-acceptance of their demands by the government.⁷ In their absence, the Central Legislature in India accepted the brief statement in which Zafarullah Khan, as leader of the House, declared, that all present were determined to do their duty to the King and the country.⁸ The Defence of India Act was passed without even a division, accordingly. The ministries and legislatures of the Punjab, Bengal and Sindh endorsed these decisions. The Hindu Mahasaba and many other minority parties also decided to cooperate with the government and so did the Chamber of Princes.⁹ The Viceroy, Linlithgow strove to persuade the Congress leaders to cooperate with the government in support of War but all in vain.

In August 1940, Lord Linlithgow issued a declaration in which he pledged that his government would accept, at the earliest possible moment after the War, India's free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth under a constitution of her own making. At the same time, it invited party leaders to cooperate in the War effort by joining the Viceroy's Executive Council.¹⁰ The Congress refused even to discuss the offer and started '*Satyagrah* Movement' against India's participation in the War. The *Satyagrah* campaign proved a complete fiasco and it died out in the course of 1941.¹¹

The Congress and League leaders rejected Cripps Proposals of 1942. It was reported that, in the Congress Working Committee, some influential leaders like Rajgopalachari were in favour of the proposals but Gandhi did not support them.¹² Congress rejected it due to two reasons. *Firstly*, Congress wanted 'to take delivery' in its hands without caring for other communities and political parties. *Secondly*, Congress was dead sure of Axis's victory in the War. Consequently, Gandhi declared the offer as "a post-dated cheque on a failing bank."¹³

Immediately after the rejection of the proposal, Gandhi concentrated all his energies on the movement to force British to quit India. He was contemplating success of his movement in view of the precarious position of Allies in Europe, Africa and particularly in Asia. He strongly believed that the British government was incapable of defending India at that moment and so India's first step would be to welcome Japan and then to negotiate with it. Thereupon, the Congress Working Committee gave definite endorsement to Gandhi's proposal on August 8, to start Quit India Movement¹⁴ (to which it referred to as an 'open rebellion'), which they had adopted on July 14.

The Muslim League had passed the Lahore Resolution in 1940 in which they had demanded the partition of India into Hindu and Muslim states on the basis of the two-nation theory.¹⁵ Earlier the Congress ministries (1937-39) had convinced them that Provincial autonomy or federal form of government could not safeguard the Muslim interests under the permanent Hindu majority rule.¹⁶ Congress' attitude towards the Muslim demand for separate homeland remained non-serious and they gave deaf ear to it. They considered it either a strategy of the colonial masters to divide and rule India or Quaid's bargaining tactics to gain more concessions for the Muslims.

Rajgopalachari (1879-1972) was one of the prominent Hindu leaders of the Congress Working Committee who were ready to come to compromise with the Muslims even on the basis of Lahore Resolution. He was the level-headed and shrewd son of India, who by his training, capacity and force of character, was head and shoulders above the general run of the Hindu politicians. He always moved out of the common groove of the Hindu feelings and that is how he checked himself to be swept away by the gorgeous phrases of Nehru and idyllic fancies of Gandhi. Born in Madras he began his career as a lawyer. He joined the Congress and came under the influence of Gandhi. Taking an active part in the non-cooperation movement, he became General Secretary of the Congress in 1921-22. He acted as the Premier of Madras from 1937 to 1939, and thus occupied a prominent position in the Congress hierarchy.

Rajgopalachari arguing in a pamphlet entitled *The Way Out*, advocated a rapprochement with the League.¹⁷ He believed that Hindu-Muslim unity was a pre-requisite for freedom from the British. He wanted to see Jinnah with a view to arrive at a settlement on Hindu-Muslim question. He was prepared to go so far as to meet the Muslim League's demand of Pakistan. The Hindus including Congress and Hindu Mahasabha leaders denounced the effort to partition India. M.R. Jayakar writes in his letter to Rajgopalachari dated January 21, 1942 that he had publicly spoken of the fifty-fifty basis being acceptable to him with Jinnah as Prime Minister. He warned Rajgopalachari, not to accept this formula at the provincial or central level. He said that Hindus would condemn this attempt and would start a violent agitation against it.¹⁸ Rajgopalachari repudiated this allegation that he had offered fifty-fifty shares to Jinnah. In his reply to Jayakar, dated January 23, 1942, he said :

*"I made the offer soon after the Poona Resolution of the Congress that if the British would accept the Proposal, I would induce the Congress to accept Jinnah as Premier with authority to form any cabinet."*¹⁹

Rajgopalachari took an active part in the *Satyagrah* Movement but after its failure, he seemed to be more realistic. Gandhi's spell on him had lost some of its intensity. From then on, he intensified his efforts to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity. He asked Congress to come forward to do something magnanimous about it and deal with the League even on the basis of Lahore Resolution. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad writes: "the British government did not wish to take any risks during the period of the War. Differences among the communities gave them a pretext for keeping the power in their own hands. Rajgopalachari did not agree with him and soon after the rejection of the Cripps Offer he began to say openly that if only the Congress would accept the League's demands, the obstacles to Indian freedom would be removed."²⁰ On failing to convince his colleagues, he was obliged to sponsor two resolutions in this regard in Madras. First resolution conceded the principle of Pakistan and the other in favour of making a League-Congress coalition.

The Madras Legislative Congress Party noted with regret that the attempts to establish a national government for India to enable her to face the problems arising out of the present grave situation had failed and that, as a result of this, nationalist India had been placed in a dilemma. It was urgently necessary in the best interests of the country at this hour of peril to do all that the Congress could possibly do to remove every obstacle in the way of the establishment of a national administration to face the present situation in so far as the Muslim League had insisted on the recognition of the right of separation of certain areas from United India upon the ascertainment of the wishes of the people of such areas as a condition precedent for a united national action at this moment of grave national danger. To their mind, it was a most unwise policy of the Congress to maintain controversy over the unity of India. The Legislative Assembly, therefore, suggested that it had become necessary to chose the lesser evil and acknowledge the Muslim League's claim for separation.²¹

Rajgopalachari was obliged to take this initiative due to number of factors. He showed serious concerns for the grave situation of the defense of India, particularly the defense of the South, which was in immediate danger from Japan's invasion. During Congress ministries, he was Premier of Madras and was in power. Now he was out of power and could not make some positive contributions for his province. The region that he belonged to was in danger, therefore, he displayed anxiety, whereas North was not under immediate foreign threat and was

apparently secure. People of the North seemed ready to welcome the fall of British government in India at the cost of the fall of South India. Therefore, it was quite natural that a Hindu from South would view the problems of Hindus of Northern India with slight amount of attachments. Contrary to Congress's expectations, Rajgopalachari was sure of 'Allies' victory.²² He also would prefer British control to Japanese whereas Gandhi and company liked to see the opposite. He certainly would endorse provincial autonomy. He might be indirectly under the influence of the movement for 'Dravidistan', which was becoming popular in Madras. It aimed at the independence of the South from the Brahmin North.²³ Ayesha Jalal gives another interesting reason. She says, "Although Cripps Mission failed, it had underlined the basic contradiction in League's demand for Pakistan. Offering provinces and not communities the right to opt out posed a potential threat to Jinnah's efforts to bring the Muslim majority provinces under a specifically common banner at the center. It raised the awkward issue of what might happen to non-Muslim minorities in the Muslim majority provinces if Muslim politicians in these provinces rallied behind Jinnah and the League. Here was an opportunity for the Congress to exploit the inherent weakness in Jinnah's strategy. Rajgopalachari tried to exploit this contradiction in Jinnah's demand for Pakistan."²⁴

But Congress High Command failed to read what was clearly written on the wall and shirked from taking this step. Accordingly, the Hindu leaders bitterly criticized Rajgopalachari's plan. The All India Congress Working Committee, in its session that was held on April 27 to May 1, 1942 at Allahabad, rejected this resolution of Madras Legislative Assembly. The president of the session observed that the two resolutions passed by the Madras Legislature were at variance with the declared policy of the Congress. As a responsible member of the Working Committee of the Congress, Shri Rajgopalachari should have avoided all association with these two resolutions. He held that if Rajgopalachari felt strongly on the subject, he should have discussed the matter with his colleagues of the Working Committee before giving expression to his views. Rajgopalachari was forced to resign, which he complied on April 30, 1942, from the membership of the Working Committee in order to propagate his ideas.²⁵

Dr. Moonje said that Rajgopalachari had learnt from his recent experience that Hindus were determined to fight to the last drop of their

blood to maintain the traditional, religious and cultural solidarity of India and Indian Empire, i.e., *Sarvabahmatva* and *Ekrashtriyatava* of their *Vedic* prayers of the entire country, lying between the river Sindh in the North and the sea in the South.²⁶ Lala Lakshmi Pat Singhania, leader of the Hindu Mahasabha remarked that "there has sprung up politically speaking a hybrid species of pro-Pakistan Hindus and they have been infecting Hindu mind as rapidly as a contagion and loathsome disease would do, Rajgopalachari had really been exerting himself with seniority and perverse fanaticism than any mad Mullah known to history."²⁷ Rajgopalachari got annoyed with the Congress for having rejected his proposals and, in its place, accepted Babu Jagat Narainial's proposals for rejecting Pakistan.

His party and his co-religionists, though, hampered his efforts; Rajgopalachari did not decline his endeavours in this connection. He openly began to propagate his views. He maintained that Japan would invade India and might conquer it. The British government might not be able to defend India efficiently. Therefore, he believed that British government would go and with it all hopes and plans of non-violence and non-cooperation, central and provincial legislatures, national government and defense ministry and every thing they were negotiating for with Stafford Cripps would come to an end. For that reason Rajgopalachari wanted to fight against Japan and defend India. He maintained that if the Madras government were in his hands he would have organized militia throughout the province.²⁸ He also wished to form coalition government with the League in Madras as well as in all provinces and at the centre.²⁹

In addition to this, Rajgopalachari quickly grasped the situation in and outside India and was determined to cooperate with the government. Accordingly, he tried to convince his party to accept Cripps Proposals. The Congress Working Committee, however, decided to start Quit India Movement on August 7, 1942. The originator and organizer of the movement was Gandhi whom Rajgopalachari, like the Hindu masses, also regarded *Bapu* and paid visits every month. Even then, he displayed enough courage to write to Gandhi on July 18, 1942 in the following terms :

"It is not natural for any government to withdraw without transferring power to successors by consent or without being forced to be replaced by another. The formation of a provisional

government, as well as the convening of a constituent assembly is possible only if the continuity of the state is assured. We feel, therefore, that however difficult the achievement of a Hindu-Muslim settlement be while the British government is here and functioning, it is essential before a demand for withdrawal can reasonably be made The major political organizations, namely the Congress party and Muslim League, should evolve a joint plan with regard to a provincial government which can take over power and preserve the continuity of the state. Even if we imagine that the British could ever, under moral compulsion, be made to withdraw unconditionally, we are convinced that the chaos which would follow under existing condition would not permit within any reasonable time the formation of a provincial government such as you contemplate. ³⁰

Gandhi in his reply to his letter dated July 20, 1942 told him that he was free to league with Muslim friends to propagate his ideas of settlement. He asked him to get common understanding over fundamentals before he comes to an agreement.³¹ Gandhi and Congress paid no heed to these proposals and carried out their open rebellion under the Quit India Movement. It created a fair amount of problems for the government, which took a number of measures to curb it down. It arrested important leaders of the Congress, including Gandhi and consequently the Movement was doomed to fail.³²

The All India Muslim League Working Committee in its session held in Bombay on August 16-20, 1942 considered Rajgopalachari's proposal for Hindu-Muslim settlement. It discussed the political situation, including forthcoming meeting between Rajgopalachari and the Quaid-i-Azam. The general view was that negotiation for a settlement with the Congress could only be entered into with the accredited spokesman of that body. Rajgopalachari's role could only be recognized as that of a mediator between the two bodies. The League and its president, might, if necessary, use their good office to help Rajgopalachari to establish any contact that he might desire to make with the imprisoned Congress leaders.³³

While the Congress leadership was in jail, the League gained maximum from this estrangement between Congress and the British. It pursued certain positive policies. During the year 1943-1944, Muslim League was emerging as the most powerful Muslim organization, which

was in power in Bengal, Assam, Sindh and in the N.W.F.P.³⁴ In the Punjab, the ministry was not a League administration, but its head and leader claimed himself to be a Leaguer.³⁵ League now controlled directly or indirectly, the provincial ministries of all the provinces that it included in the proposed Pakistan. It made the claim of Quaid-i-Azam for the establishment of Pakistan more forceful.

The 'Quit India Movement' created law and order problem and it was so intense and destructive, that the British called it 'the most serious rebellion after that of 1857'.³⁶ Therefore, Lord Linlithgow, Viceroy of India (1936-43) adopted strict measures to curb down the rebellion and put the important Congress leaders behind the bars. Lord Wavell, Viceroy of India (1943-47), followed suit and continued unbending policy towards the Congress leaders. He refused to release either Gandhi (whose wife Kasturba died in February 1944) or the others. His stand was that Congress must not merely rescind its Quit India resolution but repudiate it also as recognition of a mistaken policy. He also believed that the Congress was hindering and creating hurdles in the way of progress to self-government by its attitude.³⁷

On July 27, 1943 Gandhi wrote to Lord Wavell offering him that he would advise the Congress Working Committee to renounce the mass civil disobedience and to cooperate fully in War effort, provided that an immediate declaration of India's independence was made and national government responsible to the legislative assembly were formed. He repeated all the arguments that had been used against such policies since the time of the Cripps Proposals.³⁸ In his reply to Gandhi, Lord Wavell refused to be beguiled by the wording of the letter and saw Congress proposal as identical to those which the Congress President had made to Cripps in 1942 and which had been firmly rejected.³⁹ To this answer, Gandhi said that it meant government did not wish to transfer power to the Indians unless latter developed strength enough to wrest it from them.⁴⁰ Accordingly, Gandhi-Wavell correspondence ended in failure.

Now the Congress was once again struggling to come out of its self created isolation. Gandhi had no other option but to contact Quaid-i-Azam and to ask him to make some settlement with the Congress. Rajgopalachari, after his failure to convince his party-men to accept Cripps Proposals, had resigned from the party. For about one year, he was ploughing a lonely furrow. In the meantime, Gandhi and members of

the Working Committee were in the detention centre. Even during their absence, Rajgopalachari was endeavoring to make the headway with his proposals. His contact with the Viceroy and his wooing of the President of the League bore no fruit. But when Gandhi observed his 'capacity fast',⁴¹ the British government allowed Rajgopalachari to see Gandhi in his interment in March 1943. This time, he was able to obtain Gandhi's approval of a scheme for a settlement between Congress and the Muslim League.⁴² Quaid-i-Azam, at this stage, had no intimation of the Rajgopalachari Formula. In the course of his presidential address to Muslim League session at Delhi on April 24, 1943, he said that no body would welcome it more than myself, if Gandhi was even now really willing to come a settlement with Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan.⁴³

On April 8, 1944, Rajgopalachari met Quaid-i-Azam and revealed the contents of his formula to him. He handed over the copy of the text of the formula to Jinnah, together with a covering letter. In it, he explained that he was doing so on Gandhi's behalf because Gandhi himself was unable to negotiate any settlement personally on account of the restrictions imposed on him by the government.⁴⁴

Rajgopalachari Draft Formula for Settlement between the Congress and the Muslim League

Rajgopalachari forwarded his Formula for Jinnah's consent and signatures. In his letter dated April 8, 1944 Rajgopalachari gave the *raison d'être* of his endeavour. He said that, due to non-agreement between the Congress and the League, the condition of the country was deteriorating and had resulted in a political deadlock. Therefore, need of the time was to establish provisional government to cope with unfortunate impasse. He was pleased to inform him that Gandhi had given his approval of the Formula. Since Gandhi was in prison, so Rajgopalachari was naturally negotiating this deal on behalf of Gandhi. He elaborated the basis for terms of settlement between the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League, to which Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah could agree and which they would try respectively to get the Congress and the League to approve.⁴⁵ Following were the terms for approval :

1. Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for independence and will cooperate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional and interim government for the transitional period.

2. And after the termination of the War, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the northwest and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants, held on the basis of adult franchise, shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decides in favour of the formation of a sovereign State, separate from Hindustan, such decisions shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of the districts on the border to choose to join either State.
3. It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held.
4. In the event of separation, a mutual agreement shall be entered into for safeguarding defence, commerce and communications and other essential purposes.
5. Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely voluntary basis.
6. These terms shall only be binding in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India.⁴⁵

Besides personal meetings between Jinnah and Rajaji, sometimes secret letters were also exchanged between them to discuss the Rajgopalachari Formula. Rajgopalachari wanted thorough and clear-cut consent of Quaid-i-Azam before the latter could take the matter to Muslim League Working Committee. The Quaid-i-Azam was an astute democrat and could not give his assurance unless he had discussed the matter with the Muslim League Working Committee. He promised to place the Formula before the Muslim League Working Committee for its acceptance or rejection.⁴⁷ On June 30, Rajgopalachari wrote a letter to Quaid-i-Azam in which he complained that his letter requiring Jinnah's personal acceptance and approval of the Formula remained unanswered. Consequently, he would be obliged to publish the Formula and Jinnah's rejection.⁴⁸ He, at the same time, requested Quaid-i-Azam to reconsider his rejection. In his reply dated July 2 to Rajgopalachari's telegramme, Quaid-i-Azam said "it was your wrong version that I had rejected the Formula." He reiterated that he was still ready to place the Formula

before the Muslim League Working Committee, although, it was not open to any modification. Quaid-i-Azam said that Rajaji did not allow him to do that, and required his acceptance first which, he could not extend. Accordingly, he said that he could not go beyond his previous stand.⁴⁹ Rajgopalachari sent a telegramme to Jinnah on July 8, 1944 stating that with Jinnah's letter of July 5, private negotiations came to an end. It was, therefore, necessary and expedient to take the public into confidence. Thereupon, he released the entire correspondence between Jinnah and himself to the press.⁵⁰

Quaid-i-Azam's Reaction to the Formula

Quaid -i-Azam welcomed Rajgoplachari's efforts to settle the Hindu-Muslim question. But he had serious reservations about the methods of Rajgopalachari to put his proposals. Rajgopalachari displayed dictatorial approach to the issue, as Formula was not open to modifications or negotiations. He had neither discussed it with the President of Congress nor got approval of the Congress Working Committee before forwarding his Formula. So he represented none except himself. Though he claimed that he had the approval of Gandhi, the latter had not directly communicated the approval of his Formula to Quaid-i-Azam. Even then Quaid was ready to refer the Formula to the Muslim League Working Committee. But Rajgopalachari wanted approval and endorsement of Quaid-i-Azam beforehand, which the Quaid-i-Azam was not ready to extend without consulting the Muslim League Working Committee.⁵¹

Although Quaid-i-Azam appreciated Rajgopalachari's pains yet he had number of objections to his plan :

1. Quaid-i-Azam perceived it as pure dictation from the Congress and not its desire to settle the problem. Rajaji was an expelled member of the Congress Working Committee. He sought approval from Gandhi during his incarnation. Though Formula was a joint contribution of Gandhi and Rajaji yet it was not clear in which capacity Gandhi would act? Gandhi was not even a four-Anna member of the Congress. He had so many capacities, such as, his personal capacity, his capacity as dictator of the Congress, and above all in his Mahatmic divine authority that was guided by his inner voice and he was *Satyagrihi* and sole interpreter what

he meant and stood for. He was not a strict Hindu but a Sanatist and he followed Hinduism of his own. Therefore, it was very difficult for Quaid-i-Azam to know in what capacity Gandhi would act and how he would make other party leaders to accept the terms of the agreement?⁵²

2. Rajgopalachari insisted that Quaid-i-Azam should endorse his Formula, which if he had done, he would have been forced to get it approved from the Muslim League Working Committee. Quaid-i-Azam, by his training and nature, was a democrat, and was not ready to by-pass the Muslim League Working Committee. He, therefore, wanted it passed by the Working Committee before he could endorse it.⁵³
3. Since Ganchi had not directly communicated his approval of the Formula, he could claim that because he was not a four-Anna member of the Congress Party and so what he could do was only to persuade it to accept the Formula. His position in the Party would have not been affected even if his proposals were rejected.
4. According to the Formula, the League should have endorsed the demand for independence. Whereas Muslim league was as much keen for independence as the Congress, yet to get an announcement from the League in this regard, Rajgopalachari wished to prove that it was against the independence. This was uncalled for insinuation to make.⁵⁴ Therefore, League's demand for establishment of the two sovereign states of Pakistan and Hindustan guaranteed the independence of the whole sub-continent in a peaceful and just manner.
5. There was no indication of the form, function, power, character, and composition of the provincial governments.⁵⁵ In the formation of a provisional interim government for the transitional period the Congress could occupy superior position and League would cooperate as subordinate body with this organization.

6. It was not clear who would appoint the Commission and whose duty it would be to demarcate the contiguous districts in northeast and northwest of India and to hold a Plebiscite of all inhabitants of those districts where Muslims formed majority? It was also not stated what would be its powers and who would enforce them?⁵⁶
7. In the modern concept of state, states are independent and sovereign in their internal and external policies. The Formula provided that in the event of separation mutual agreements would be entered into for safeguarding defense, commerce and communications and for other essential purposes. Quaid-i-Azam opposed this clause on the ground that there existed no specific authority or organization to settle the controversial matters and to provide remedies and safeguards in this behalf. Would they be treaties or would they take the form of some kind of central agency or authority?⁵⁷
8. Quaid-i-Azam was against the division of the Punjab and Bengal, whereas Rajgopalachari insisted on it. In fact, the feeling behind this demand was to allay the fears of the Muslims who would be left behind in Hindustan after partition. The Hindus of the provinces under Muslim rule would have served as principle hostages against the ill treatment of Muslims in the Hindu majority provinces.⁵⁸
9. The last clause of the Rajgopalachari Formula was most ingenious which stipulated that terms would be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India. It did not say to whom Britain would transfer full power and responsibility? The Quaid had no trust on Hindus and particularly on the Congress in this matter.⁵⁹ Commonly known ideals of the Congress were that it scrambled to grab the central power and once they had occupied the centre, they might be free to do for their liking to undo any resolution, agreement or formula. The Quaid wanted the division and independence of India and Pakistan together. It was with this view that he said that the acceptance of this clause would be like putting the cart before the horse.⁶⁰

CONCLUSION

Rajgopalachari Formula was in fact an effort to break the political impasses in India and to make Congress and League come to terms for getting independence from the foreign rule. Rajaji was probably the first important Hindu leader who not only realized the genuineness of the League's demand for a separate State for the Muslims but also tried to convince the Congress leaders to accept the division of India on the basis of the Lahore Resolution. Gandhi gave importance to his views but did not regard them worth considering till the complete failure of the 'Quit India movement.' After discussing and getting the authorization of Gandhi secretly in jail in 1943, Rajagopalachari put this Formula to Quaid-i-Azam for his consent in 1944. Quaid-i-Azam was ready to refer it to the Working Committee of All India Muslim League for its approval, but Rajgopalachari demanded that Quaid-i-Azam should accept it first and approve it explicitly before taking the matter to the Working Committee. However, Quaid-i-Azam declined to toe this line. Consequently, Rajaji announced the failure of his secret negotiations with Quaid-i-Azam and held him responsible for its failure. But the fact of the matter was that Quaid-i-Azam and the Muslim League Working Committee had reservations and objections regarding the Formula.

Rajgopalachari was not an accredited nominee of the Congress to settle the matters with the League, whereas Gandhi was not even a 'Four Anna' member of the Congress. Although, Rajaji accepted the principle of the division of India, yet he was not ready to implement it before the departure of the British government. He had suggested the division of the Punjab and Bengal on communal basis and had also proposed to establish a joint board for India and Pakistan to make some agreement pertaining to joint defence, communication, commerce etc. That was also unacceptable to the League. Quaid-i-Azam wanted full guarantee of complete sovereignty and independence first and the withdrawal of the British later. To him, the Formula was a snare, which offered a maimed, husked and moth-eaten Pakistan.

The Hindu leaders other than those of the Congress opposed the Rajgopalachari formula. They could never permit anybody to suggest the division of India. They considered it a sin to divide their Holy Land. Therefore they bitterly criticized Rajgopalachari for his scheme for the division of India. The Hindu Mahasabha became very vocal against it.

They threatened to start a movement against the Formula if it was accepted and implemented. They said they were ready to stop, at all cost, the division of India and would offer all kind of sacrifice in this connection. They started preparing themselves for this situation, which ultimately resulted in a civil war at the time of partition in 1947.

The British welcomed all those efforts, which might have brought Hindu-Muslim unity during the World War II. It seemed that they were ready to endorse that plan which accommodated the important communities like those of the Muslims and Sikhs. But the last thing that they might have tolerated was the division of India whom they had given unity and were proud of it. Although, the British did not endorse the Formula, yet in the end they were compelled to divide India on the lines suggested by Rajgopalachari.

REFERENCES

1. I.H. Qurshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, Karachi, 1987, pp.99-113
2. "Lord Samuel's speech in the House of Lords on April 6, 1943. *Indian Annual Register, 1943.*"
3. All India National Congress although had a few Muslims and other religious communities but it was a basically a Hindu party.
4. Abdul Hamid, *Muslim Separation in Pakistan*, Lahore.
5. K. K. Aziz, *Muslim Sufferings under the Congress Ministries*,
6. Nehru declared in 1937 that there were only two parties in India, namely: British and the Congress. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah corrected him by saying that there was a third party that is Muslims.
7. Satyapal and Probadh Chandra, *Sixty Years of India: India lost and India Regained*, Lahore, 1946, pp.324-26.
8. *Indian Annual Register 1943*, p.365.
9. *Ibid.* pp.365-66.
10. Muhammad Iqbal Chawla, "Wavell Breakdown Plan", *Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society*, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Vol. XXV, 2000, p.2.
11. Richard Symond, *The Making of Pakistan*, London, 1950, p.63.
12. Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit*, London, 1961, p.27.
13. Percival Spear, *A History of India*, Vol.II, England, 1975, pp.219.
14. P.E. Roberts, *History of British India*, England, 1952, pp.641-42.
15. Shafique Ali Khan, *Two Nation Theory*
16. I. H. Qureshi, *op.cit.* pp.123-37.
17. K. K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan*, Islamabad, 1977, p.64.
18. "M. R. Jayaka to C. Rajgopalachari, dated January 21, 1942," in B. N. Pandey, (ed.), *The Indian Nationalist Movement-1885-1947*, Select Documents, Delhi, 1979, pp.167-78.

19. "C. Rajgopalachari to Jayakar dated January 23, 1942," *Ibid.* p.169.
20. Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims: A Political History*, Lahore, 1976, p.300.
21. H. V. Hudson, *The Great Divide, Britain, India, Pakistan*, London, 1969, p.107.
22. Tarachand, *History of the Freedom Movement*.
23. Shafique Ali Khan, *Mr. Jinnah as Political Thinker*, Karachi, 1974, p.143.
24. Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, London, 1963, p.82.
25. *Indian Annual Register 1942*, Vol.I, pp.289-90.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Rajgopalachari to Gandhi dated July 18, 1942.*
31. *Gandhi to Rajgopalachari, dated July 20, 1942.*
32. Richard V. Weeks, *Pakistan Birth and Growth of a Muslim Nation*, London, 1964, p.90-92.
33. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *Speeches and Writing of Mr. Jinnah*, Lahore, 1960, pp.456-58.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Transfer of Power*,
36. *Wavell Papers*, NDC, Islamabad.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*
40. Penderal Moon, *Wavell: the Viceroy's Journal*, Karachi, 1973, pp.69-70.
41. *Ibid.* p.78.
42. *Ibid.* pp.79.
43. Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided*, Lahore, 1978, pp.218-19.
44. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, *Speeches and Writing of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol.II, Lahore, 1964, pp.57-64.
45. Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah: A Political Study*, Lahore, 1953, pp.520-24.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*
49. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *op.cit.* p.61.
50. Sharif-ud-Din Pirzada, (ed.), *Foundations of Pakistan*, Vol. II, Karachi, pp.489-90.
51. Cahudri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1967, p.46.
52. S. Abdul Latif, *The Great Leader*, Lahore, 1965, pp.140-45.
53. Ian Stephens, *Pakistan*, London, 1963, pp.78-81.
54. Justice Syed Shamim Hussain Kadri, *Creation of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1983, pp.289-96.
55. Dr. Muhammad Aslam Qurshi, *Anglo Pakistan Relations, 1947-1976*, p.23.
56. G. Allana, (ed.), *Pakistan Movement: Historical Documents*, Karachi, 1968, pp.341-375.
57. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Vol.II, pp.60-70.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Ibid.*

Quaid-i-Azam from the Nationalist Muslim to the Muslim Nationalist

AMNA MAHMOOD

In keeping with their traditions the Hindu historians have often tried to tarnish the image of Qaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah by portraying him as leader of minority who disregarded the interests of (Hindu) majority and thereby acted against the nationalist spirit. This anachorism has, however, been disproved and today Quaid-i-Azam stands out as a great patriot who has carved out for himself a permanent niche in the sands of time. As a matter of fact tendentious attitude of the Hindu Congress compelled Mohammed Ali Jinnah to divert his political struggle from the demand of 'home rule' to that of the 'partition of India.'

This article is a modest attempt to examine a few issues *viz-a-viz*, the transformation of a 'nationalist Jinnah' to the leader of Muslim India during the period from 1905 to 1935. Quaid-i-Azam who entered politics as an ardent nationalist and earned the reputation of the 'Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity,' was forced to leave the Indian National Congress in 1920.

Many biased Hindu and Western writers attribute this change to what they call his inability to share the so called revolutionary views of Gandhi and Nahru. They also argue that having realized that he could not clinch the top party position, Jinnah parted his ways with the Congress. As a consequence, he emerged as the Muslim community leader refusing to compromise on anything less than a separate homeland for Muslims of India.¹

These allegations are diametrically opposed to the study of both the personality and politics of Jinnah. Those who analyse Jinnah as a person can easily understand his creed of undefeated will, clarity of thought and

conviction about his actions. Those who analyze about his political career can observe his unremittable belief in constitutionalism, straightforwardness and commitment with his cause.² True, he worked tirelessly to achieve Hindu-Muslim unity but only to get maximum benefits for both parties in the event of self-government for India. The Lucknow Pact was the triumph for Jinnah.³ However, when he was compelled to leave Home Rule League and Congress, he still maintained that 'Swaraj' could only be achieved by a united struggle of all the communities of India. He even exhorted the Muslims to agree to joint electorates in order only to achieve unity for an agreed constitutional formula. In the sour atmosphere of Nehru Report (1928), he still preserved his objective of having communal accord. Despite his 'parting of ways' and disappointment after the rejection of Fourteen Points, Coupland says that he was prepared in 1934-35 to revive the *Etente* of Lucknow Pact period for the cause of nationalism.⁴

But the aggressive response from Hindu leaders and press, after Nehru Report, turned Jinnah's political direction in the next five years. This was the period of transition from his position of a 'Nationalist Muslim' to a 'Muslim Nationalist'.⁵ Eventually Jinnah ended up as an undefeated advocate of Muslim Nationalism (1940-47). It was mainly due to the circumstances, and most of all the "stubborn folly and intransigence of the Hindu majority in the Congress,"⁶ which led to a shift in Jinnah's politics from being a champion of Hindu-Muslim unity to its most determined opponent.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in his very first appearance at the Congress session at Calcutta in 1906, delivered his speech on *Waqf-ul-Aulad*, an issue which was directly related with the lego-religious and socio-economic interests of Muslim community. Jinnah successfully piloted the bill in Imperial Legislative Council. It became the first private bill that reached the statute book in the history of India.⁷ Jinnah earned the reputation of having exceptional legislative competence and parliamentary skill along with a deep insight into Muslim Jurisprudence.⁸

In the words of Sarojini Naidu, he won "not only the appreciation of his colleagues but also got the general recognition from his co-religionists all over India...(who) soon began to seek his advice and guidance in their political affairs."⁹

Amongst the prominent Indians, having close relations with Mr. Jinnah, were Surendernath Bangerjea, Dadabhai Naoroji and Gokhale. All these persons were moderate and liberal away from sectarian differences. Jinnah had already absorbed liberalism from the speeches of British Parliamentarians like W. E. Gladstone and John Morley. He followed the footsteps of the moderate Indian leaders. Gokhale himself was a supporter of Hindu-Muslim unity. Jinnah demonstrated his appreciation for him saying that it was his ambition to become Muslim Gokhale.¹⁰ Jinnah's association with such liberals kept all communal feelings away from him.

Even when Jinnah was first elected to the Imperial Council from the constituency reserved for Muslims of Bombay, he was a member of Congress. As a staunch Congressman he was a strong critic of separate representation. Sir. Aga Khan, at that time remarked that "Jinnah was the only well-known Muslim (who) came out in bitter hostility towards all that I and my friends have done and were trying to do."¹¹

Quaid-i-Azam then strongly believed that the separate electorate was dividing the nation. Hence for the next few years, his approach towards communal representation remained unchanged. As a member of the Congress delegation that called on the Governor General to place before him their view about separate representation, he said :

"Salvation of India lies in a true union of the people ... when you find the '*Etente Cordiale*' between England and France an accomplished fact, when you find that the Europe consisting of different nationalities and powers can maintain what was known as concert of powers during the recent war, it is too much to talk and appeal to Hindus and Mohammedans, the two great communities of India, to combine in a one harmonious union for the common good, where we have to live together in every district, town and hamlet, where our daily life is interwoven with each other with every square mile of one common country. This is the problem of all problems that the statesman in India had to solve before any true advance and real progress can be achieved."¹²

By 1912, however, a metamorphosis had set in when Quaid-i-Azam attended the League Council meeting for the first time as a guest at Bankipur. The League Council adopted the resolution of self-government

suitable to India as a new ideal of Muslim League. Jinnah appreciated this ideal as it was an improvement on Congress' ideal. He prophesied that "soon Congress will adopt the same form as suggested by League."¹¹

Later in London, Syed Wazir Hasan and Mohammad Ali convinced Jinnah that since the aims of Congress and Muslims League were similar, therefore he should join the League as member. Jinnah did so on the condition that "loyalty to Muslim League and Muslim interest would in no way and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty at the larger national cause to which his life was dedicated."¹²

The national cause to which Jinnah had dedicated his life was the freedom from the British rule. He well understood that freedom could not be achieved overnight. Before the country got freedom, it would have to be prepared educationally, economically, militarily and more than everything else communally united. People had to confront the British Crown with the united demand for freedom. The dual membership of Congress and League would enable him to work more effectively for Hindu-Muslim unity.¹³

The new development in early 1910s was the realization of the need of unity and understanding by many other prominent Indians. One reason for this urgency was that the partition of Bengal had led to much estrangement between Hindus and Muslims. As a confidence-building move a conference of Hindu and Muslim leaders was held at Allahabad in January 1911 on the suggestion of Sir. William Wedderburn the President of Congress. Jinnah then worked to bring about an understanding between Congress and League. Unfortunately nothing resulted out of it. Yet the Muslim leaders remained interested for a harmony between the two communities.¹⁶ The repeal of the partition of Bengal further advanced the need for communal harmony.

The 1913 session of Muslim League adopted a resolution calling for the need of cooperation. The resolution suggested a meeting of four members of each community at Lucknow in the following September. Secretary of the League also contacted Jinnah in that connection.¹⁷ Jinnah said in his reply: "I am one of them who fairly believe that the unity of two communities in India is absolutely necessary for the purpose of India and also that sooner or later these communities will be united."¹⁸

The outbreak of First World War and Indian cooperation with the British government led many Indians to believe that India would get freedom sooner than earlier expected.¹⁹ Jinnah thought that British government would accept the demand for transfer of power only when the two major communities of India had reached an understanding about the future constitution. Congress announced its annual session in Bombay in December 1915. Jinnah got opportunity to persuade Muslim leaders to hold League's annual session also at Bombay. Largely at the initiative of Jinnah, a special effort was made to furnish a cordial atmosphere by inviting several prominent Congress leaders to the League session. They included M. K. Gandhi, Mrs. Annie Besant and Mrs. Sarojini Naidu. Mr. Suleman Kassim Mitha, a prominent League leader, remarked that although the business of session was conducted in the name of Muslim League but in fact it was a Congress body.²⁰

Both League and Congress appointed separate committees to formulate a scheme for unity. Jinnah guided the committee explaining what he had in his mind:

"Differences in details such as method of securing to Mohammedans their adequate share in the Council chambers, municipal and district boards, should not be allowed to create an 'impasse' ... It is not a question of a few more seats going to the Mohammedans or the Hindus. It is a question in the first instance of transfer of power from bureaucracy to democracy. Let us concentrate all our attention and energy on this question alone for the present. The Hindus and the Mohammedans should stand united and seek constitutional and legitimate means to effect that transfer as soon as possible."²¹

Later on the League and the Congress held simultaneous sessions at Lucknow and approved the joint scheme chalked out by their committees. This became famous as Lucknow Pact. Jinnah and Tilak fathered it for League and Congress, respectively. Jinnah became the spokesman of both Congress and the League. As an acknowledgement of his efforts, he was given the title of 'the best Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity' and 'embodied symbol of Hindu-Muslim unity.'²²

There were two parts of the scheme. One dealt with the representation of the Muslims and the other with reforms. The right of separate electorate was accepted for Mohammedans and principle of

'weightage' was adopted for their representation in Muslim minority provinces, like U.P. Bihar, Central Provinces, Madras and Bombay. It was reciprocated by reducing their representation to fifty per cent and forty per cent in Punjab and Bengal respectively.²³

Although many Muslim leaders expressed their dissatisfaction over the formula of representation yet its advantage lay in the acceptance of Punjab and, long opposed 'separate electorate' for Muslims. By the Pact Congress accepted Muslim League as the sole representative of Muslims of India, which according to Ram Gopal reduced the Congress for all practical purposes to a communal organization, mainly of Hindus. Another gain of the Pact, was that the joint demand of the 'United India' compelled both Delhi and London to take up the Indian issue in the midst of the War (1914-18).²⁴

Jinnah was the main architect of the Lucknow Pact. Jinnah maintained that "the demand for the separate electorates is ... a matter of... necessity to the Mohammedans who required to be roused from the comma and the torpor into which they had fallen for so long." He accepted this as "a mandate of the community."²⁵ Jinnah emphatically denied the allegations by some Muslim leaders that there was some proposal of merging the Muslim leaders into Congress. He made it clear that it was a conference in collaboration.²⁶ Jinnah joined Home Rule League of Mrs. Annie Besant in 1916. She was a strong supporter of Hindu-Muslim unity.

The Hindu-Muslim unity was apparently achieved at the level of leaders of both sections in the Lucknow Pact but it failed at the level of masses despite the efforts of Gandhi and Maulana Mohammad Ali both of whom actively took part in the non-cooperation cum Khilafat Movement. But Jinnah, despite his concerns for the future of Turkey, kept himself aloof from it, because he was convinced that the reason was (not) behind it.²⁷

Jinnah's conviction came true when ultimately the movement ended in serious incidences of violence, heavy losses of lives in 'Chura-Churi' and 'Moplahs uprising.' The treatment and response towards Moplahs strained Hindu-Muslim relations, never to recover at the masses level. Gandhi admitted his folly as a 'Himalayan mistake'.²⁸

The reforms introduced in 1919, by Montague-Chemsford Act, altered the political arithmetic. It made Hindu-Muslim relations more complicated, as it became clear that Muslims were not uniformly a minority throughout India. They were in majority in the Punjab, Bengal, Sindh and North Western Frontier Provinces. Hence they were capable of controlling political power.

It was a difficult situation. It did not find favours with the Muslim majority provinces like Punjab and Bengal.²⁹ Still, however, it was the manifestation of Jinnah's negotiating skill who successfully persuaded, the Congress to accept the right of separate electorates for Muslims. Soon Congress realized its 'mistake' and once again started a violent campaign against the separate electorates around the middle of Twenties.³⁰

Dissociation from Congress

In 1917, Jinnah made an important statement that clearly described the reasons for his continuous association with the Congress. It was a warning to the Hindu chauvinist and a message of hope for Muslims. He said: "Do you think that because the Hindus are in majority they would carry a measure in the legislative assembly and there is an end of it? If seventy millions of Muslims do not approve of a measure do you think it can be enforced in this country?"³¹

From 1913 onwards, Jinnah had been most effective to achieve his political goals of 'united India' and 'self-government' in India under the British Empire. But this dual membership ended in December 1920.

Earlier Jinnah had resigned from Home Rule League on the same grounds. Mrs. Besant, its creator, had already resigned on the account that the Home Rule League had "become so intertwined with religion." Gandhi who got himself elected as president of Home Rule League very cleverly changed its title to *Swarraj Sabha*—a Hindi alternative of Home Rule League. He then altered its constitution from self-government for India to 'complete freedom' using all means to attain it. Jinnah quickly resopned by declaring that 'this meeting was not competent to amend the constitution of the League.' But Gandhi as a chairman answered that 'it was open to any member, ... to resign his membership,' if he was not able to abide by the 'changed constitution.'³² Jinnah with nineteen other members decided to resign. This was a turning point.

At Nagpur session, fourteen thousand delegates supported the decision of Home Rule League. Jinnah was not against agitation but he distrusted the destructive methods. He was also against the unconstitutional ways for the political struggle.

There were many prominent Congressmen such as C.R. Das and Lala Lajpat Rai who did not agree with Gandhi's programme of using every means to attain 'Swaraj.' But Jinnah was the only one in that crowd of several thousand who dared to express his disagreement openly: "My only reason," he said, "and I hope you will really believe me when I say that my only reason today to stand on this platform and speak before you against this proposition that I honestly believe, I am convinced in my mind, that this step you are taking is not right step to take at this moment."¹³

But his voice of practical statesmanship was not heeded and Jinnah walked out, not only from the session but from the All India Congress as well. Col. Wedg-Wood who was present in that session as a delegate of British Labour Party, remarked that "India was on the road of freedom as she was capable of producing at least one person of remarkable strength, who could stand by his conviction in the face of huge opposition."¹⁴

Jinnah smelled the danger inherent in the new creed of Congress. He saw this mass awakening as a symbol of Hindu revivalism—a threat to other communities including Muslims. Jawaher Lal Nehru, commenting on Jinnah's rupture with Congress, said: "Temperamentally he did not fit in at all with the new Congress. He felt completely out of his element in the *Khadi*-clad crowd demanding speeches in Hindustani."¹⁵ In his latter work Nehru reiterated that "Jinnah left Congress because he could not adapt himself to the new and more advanced ideology and even more so because he disliked the crowd of ill-dressed people talking in Hindustani, who filled the Congress."¹⁶

This is a false and misinterpretation of Jinnah's political stand. During his fourteen-years' stay at Congress, he had freely mingled with the *Khadi*-clad and ill-dressed crowd. Moreover, the fact is that the people whom Jinnah led in the latter years—the Muslims, were even poorer and less educated than the Hindus. Those who blamed Jinnah that he left Congress because it adopted the constitution of complete freedom ignored the fact that Jinnah was the "bitterest critic of British rule throughout his political career."¹⁷

Jinnah explained the reason for his dissociation from the Congress. He said: "I have nothing to do with this pseudo-religious approach to politics. I part the company with Congress and Gandhi. I do not believe in working with mob hysteria. Politics is a gentleman's game."³⁸ Jinnah predicted that freedom achieved through this way would lead to bloodshed. He wrote to Gandhi in 1920 accusing him of having "already caused split and division in almost every institution you have approached hitherto."³⁹ He accused Gandhi of destroying the ideal with which the Congress was started. Gandhi, he said was the man responsible for turning the Congress into an instrument for the revival of Hinduism.

These words of Jinnah for Gandhi were not merely revelation or accusation. Jawaharlal Nehru accepted that Gandhi was essentially a Hindu to the innermost depths of his being. Even the terminology he used in politics was Hindu in character. Non-cooperation and nonviolence (*Satyagraha*) were all the new names of Hindu 'law of sufferings'. Gandhi left no one in doubt with regard to his own religious beliefs. Subhas Chandra Bose says, "when the Mahatma speaks, he does so in a language ... of the *Bhagvat Gita* and *Ramayana*. When he talks to them about *Swaraj* ... he reminds them of the glories of *Ramayana*."⁴⁰

Jinnah was not only a Muslim Leaguer but also a member of the Indian Legislative Assembly. He was representing the Muslims of Bombay after his reelection in 1923. He was leading the independent group in the legislature but was no longer an All India man. The appellation 'ambassador of unity' as it was used some years earlier, was no longer added to his name. But Jinnah did not give up his idea that the complete independence is not possible without Hindu-Muslim unity. Jinnah stressed upon the Muslims to organize themselves under the banner of League as the Hindus were organized. Hindu-Muslim etente could only be achieved when both parties would be equally organized.

In May 1924, commenting upon the situation of India, Jinnah reiterated his enduring belief at a Muslim League meeting at Lahore. He said :

"The advent of foreign rule and its continuance in India is primarily due to the fact that the people of India, particularly the Hindus and Muslims, are not united and do not sufficiently trust each other ... India will get the dominion status and responsible government the day the Hindus and Muslims are united."⁴¹

But these conciliatory words were lost in the widening gulf between these two communities. Jinnah with Jayaker even planned to set up a new nationalist organization with the unity of all parties and Swaraj as its creed but the Swaraj party of Gandhi thwarted this move. Jinnah later recalled that "from 1925 onwards ... many efforts were made for the adjustment of Hindu Muslim differences ... Every time we were the petitioners, the supplicant standing on the doors of Mr. Gandhi and the Congress, with our proposal formulated." He disappointedly added, "for some reason or the other the reply was 'no'".⁴²

Another Bid For Unity

Jinnah, on the question of dealing with Simon Commission, decided to follow the Congress' policy of boycott as a gesture of good will,⁴³ and also as another attempt to bring about intercommunal rapprochement. However, this proposal did not find favour with the Muslim League.

This bid for unity was based mainly on four proposals. They were: Sindh should be separated from Bombay; reforms should be introduced in NWFP and Baluchistan on the same pattern as in other provinces; representation in Punjab and Bengal should be on the basis of population; and in the Imperial Legislative Assembly Muslim representation should be not less than one-third of the total Indian representation. It was proposed that Muslims and Hindus would offer the same concession to minorities in their majority provinces on reciprocal basis. These proposals later became known as Delhi Proposals and became the basis for future negotiations between Muslim League and Congress.⁴⁴

Congress welcomed these proposals but reaction of Hindu Mahasabha was distinctively unfavourable. All Parties Conference was convened at Delhi in 1928. They again met at Bombay a few months later. The task of drafting a constitution for free India was entrusted to an eight member committee headed by Motilal Nehru. The recommendations of this committee were named 'Nehru Report.' It was finally discussed at All Parties National Convention in 1928.

The Hindustan Times as a representative of Hindu reaction stated that if the Muslims were demanding majorities in Sindh, the NWFP, and Baluchistan, then Hindus wanted to reconstitute Punjab and Bengal in

order to eliminate Muslim majorities. It also reiterated that the Hindus did not consider the acceptance of joint electorate as a satisfactory price.⁴⁵

Nehru Report And Jinnah

From the Muslim point of view, Nehru Report practically rejected all the proposals of Muslims except the one related to the joint electorates. Jinnah presented his amendment including one-third representation for Muslims in the Central Legislature; Muslim representation proportionate to their population for ten years in Punjab and Bengal subject to revision; and allocation of residuary powers to the provinces, not to the Centre. The subcommittee of the Convention rejected all these amendments.

Yet Jinnah did not lose heart. He himself presented the 'case' of Muslims to the Convention. He insisted that Muslim minority in India needed safeguards. It was a cultural and religious minority and its status was not changeable.

"I am exceedingly sorry that the Report of the Committee is neither helpful nor fruitful in anyway whatsoever. I think that it will be recognized that a Hindu-Muslim settlement should be reached, and that all the communities should live in a friendly and harmonious spirit in the vast country of ours."⁴⁶

Jinnah warned that any constitution in which minorities would be insecure would lead to revolt and civil war. Jinnah appealed to the Muslims to organize themselves, stand united and press every reasonable point for the protection of their unity.

Sir Tej Bahader who represented liberals supported Jinnah but others under the influence of Mahasbha were not ready to heed his proposals. They declared him a spoilt child who represented himself and none else. M.R. Jayaker, the Bombay Mahasbha leader, warned the Convention that any amendment would reopen the issue with the possibility of its rejection. At the end, Jinnah's amendments were rejected. Jinnah walked out from the All Parties Conference with tearful eyes.⁴⁷ He was disappointed for the first time on his disillusionment from all hopes for unity. On leaving Calcutta, he told Jamshed Nesserwanjee, who later became Mayor of Karachi, "*Jamshed! this is parting of the ways.*"⁴⁸

The reaction to Nehru Report was hostile from almost all the minority groups. Christians and Sikhs also rejected the report. Sardar Mengal Singh, the Sikh member of the Nehru Committee, was compelled to leave the secretaryship of Sikh League for the part he had played in the report. Muslim members of the Committee had never been recognized as leaders of Muslim community.⁴⁹

Jinnah, like almost all other Muslim leaders, was convinced that the Hindus wanted the majority rule without any reservations for minorities. Jinnah formulated his Fourteen Points to present the Muslim demands. He hoped that his new stand would unite all the Muslim parties and groups under the banner of League.

When the British government called the Round Table Conference on constitutional reforms in India, Jinnah was also invited. Addressing its fifth plenary meeting, he said:

"There is no section in India that has not emphatically declared that India must have a full measure of self government ... unless you create that sense of security among the minorities, which will secure a willing cooperation to the state, no constitution that you may frame will work successfully."⁵⁰

The first and the second conference remained inconclusive due mainly to Gandhi's intransigence who claimed himself to be the sole representative of all sections of Indian population. The issue was thus left to be decided by the British Prime Minister who gave his 'award' in 1932.

Jinnah got strongly disappointed at Gandhi's stubborn attitude about communal harmony. He told the Aligarh students in 1938, "I received the shock of my life at the meeting of Round Table Conference. In the face of danger the Hindu sentiments, the Hindu mind, the Hindu attitude led me to the conclusion that there was no hope for unity."⁵¹ The Round Table Conference thus led Jinnah to change his vision about the future of Muslims in India.

When the constitutional proposals were published in the form of a white paper, almost all sections of India were unsatisfied. At the meeting of the Council of League in 1934, Jinnah said:

"India looks forward to a real, solid, united front. Can we even at this eleventh hour bury the hatchet, and forget the past in the presence of

imminent danger, and close our ranks to get sufficient strength to resist what is being hatched both at Downing Street and in Delhi? It is up to the leaders to put their heads together, and nothing will give me greater happiness than to bring about complete co-operation and friendship between Hindus and Muslims ..."⁵²

League and Congress both could not suggest any agreed modification. Jinnah held talks with Congress President Rajendra Prasad to evolve an acceptable formula for both communities but this proposal was rejected by Hindus in Punjab and Bengal and the end result was zero.⁵³ The Congress was not willing to let Muslims remain in decision making position anywhere in India. It was not ready to deal with Muslim League either. It was hence clear that Muslims being divided in a large number of parties and groups were not able to emerge as a strong opposition in the elections.

Nehru described communal problem as the economic one. According to him the communal question in India had no importance because "it was the creation of a third party." He claimed that there were only two parties in the country, the British Government and the Congress. Jinnah responded that there is a third party too; namely, Muslims. He said: "We are not going to become camp followers of any party. We are ready to work as equal partners for the welfare of India."⁵⁴

Jinnah co-operated with Congress in 1935-36 on trade agreements, law amendment bills and opposing budget proposals. The cooperation was so close that the Viceroy complained: "Jinnah is more Congress than the Congress."⁵⁵ Jinnah cooperated with Congress in the elections of 1937. But at the time of formation of governments in the provinces, the terms of cooperation that Congress offered were not less than the absorption of Muslim League into the Congress. Jinnah requested Gandhi to use his influence in this matter. But he replied hypocritically, "I wish I could do something but I am utterly helpless. My faith in unity is bright as ever but I see no daylight out of the impenetrable darkness and in such distress I cry out to God for light."⁵⁶

It seemed that it was the Congress rule in provinces, above anything else, which convinced Jinnah that Muslims had very special interests which had to be safeguarded. Now he openly expressed that Congress was a Hindu party for all practical purposes and it could not look after the interest of Muslims:

"On the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given the majority community have clearly shown their hand; that

Hindustan is for the Hindus ... since they have formed governments in the six provinces where they are in a majority, they have by their words, deeds and programme shown, more and more, that the Muslims cannot expect any justice or fair play at their hands."⁵⁷

Now Jinnah despite his desire and fullest efforts for unity became distrustful of Gandhi and Congress. In an article published on 19 January 1940, Jinnah expressed his views that "a constitution must be evolved that recognizes that there are in India two nations who both must share the governance of their common motherland" and it was on this basis that "the Muslims were ready to co-operate with the British Government and the Congress or any other party."⁵⁸

In other words, according to Jinnah, a Hindu-Muslim settlement was possible only on the basis that there were two nations in India. But the two-nation theory was not acceptable to the Congress. Jinnah was, therefore, left with no option except to discard the concept of 'our country' that he had maintained for a long period of three decades. He decided to abandon the 'common motherland' and demanded that the two nations should have their own separate states.

CONCLUSION

After the long struggle of three decades for Hindu-Muslim unity, Jinnah finally came to the conclusion with a great despair that the Congress and its Hindu leaders could never accommodate the legitimate interests of Muslims. He reached the conclusion that the Muslims demands could never find fulfillment in a united India because Hindus were not ready to acknowledge the Muslims as a nation. The leaders of Congress did not feel the need to solve communal problem in India because under the British modelled institutions of self-government, the majority was the authority. So after the attainment of *Swaraj*, in the Hindu dominated plural society of India, there would be left no community to pose any threat for 'Hindus' *Raj*' not even the seventy million Muslims.

Jinnah worked tirelessly and vigorously as a bridge-builder between the two communities, much more than any of his illustrious contemporaries did for a composite Indian nationalism. His vision of Indian nationalism was the one, which would be capable of absorbing the diverse and particularistic demands of the different religious lingual and ethnic groups. He was a rational constitutionalist who always stood for politics of consensus. He was fully aware of the apprehensions of various

minorities and considered them reconcilable through a rational process of accommodating each other's demand. He believed that India could get freedom only if it could stand united and politically free of communal problems.

He had articulated the Lucknow Pact as beacon of Hindu-Muslim unity in conformity with his vision of Indian nationalism. But transformation of Indian politics into Hindu politics with its goal of establishment of Hindu *Raj*, dealt a death knell to the communal harmony in the sub-continent. Congress's ridiculous behaviour thus ultimately led Jinnah towards his final disillusionment. It was the consistent denial of accepting Muslims as a nation different from Hindus, having their special interests, and the right to safeguard them that ended in 'parting of ways.' Jinnah's emergence from a Nationalist Muslim leader to a Muslim Nationalist was thus complete and final.

Jinnah of 1905 was very much the 'Ambassador of Unity' of 1916 and Quaid-i-Azam of 1947. His policy of communal respect and safeguards for all did not change even after the attainment of Pakistan. His spirit remained the same even when in his address to the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan as a Governor General, he pledged to make Pakistan a safe place for all Pakistanis without any discrimination on the basis of caste, colour and creed.

REFERENCES

1. *The News*, Lahore, December 25, 2000, p. 21.
2. J. J. Pal, *Jinnah and Creation of Pakistan*, Delhi, 1983, p. 60.
3. Dr K. F. Yusuf, (ed.), *Politics and Policies of Quaid-i-Azam*, Islamabad, 1994, p. 83.
4. Ahmed Hassan Dani, (ed.), *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah*, Islamabad, p. 90.
5. Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan*, Washington, 1936, p. 253.
6. Ahmed Hasan Dani, (ed.), op.cit., p. 91.
7. Waheed-uz-Zaman, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah* Islamabad, 1985, p. 4.
8. Ahmed Hassan Dani, (ed.), op. cit., p. 93.
9. Ibid.
10. Sarojini Naidu, *Mohammed Ali Jinnah*, Madrass, 1918, p. 116. and Munir Ahmed Munir, (ed.), *An Ambassador of Unity*, Lahore, 1989, p. 13.
11. *The Memoirs of Aga Khan*, London, 1954, p. 94.
12. Ahmed Hassan Dani, (ed.), op cit., p. 96.
13. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Foundation of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1969, p. 259.
14. Sarojini Naidu, op. cit., p. 11.
15. Waheed-uz-Zaman, op cit., p. 6.
16. *Archives of Freedom Movement*, Karachi University Library, File No. 115 (Hindu-Muslim Unity), p. 5.
17. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, op cit., p. 281.
18. *Archives of Freedom Movement*, op cit., p. 7.
19. D. Chakrabarty and C. Battacharya, *Congress in Evolution*, Calcutta, p. 351.
20. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, op cit., p. 351.
21. Ahmed Hassan Dani, (ed.), op cit., p. 116.
22. Saleem M. M. *Qureshi, Jinnah and Making of a Nation*, Karachi, 1969, p. 29.
23. Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims: A Political History 1858-1947*, Lahore, 1976, pp. 129-130.
24. Ibid.
25. Ahmed Hassan Dani, (ed.), op cit., p. 117.

26. A. A. Ravooof, *Meet Mr. Jinnah*, Second Edition., Lahore, pp. 53-54.
27. Ahmed Hassan Dani, (ed.), op cit., p. 117.
28. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, Karachi, 2nd ed., 1982, p. 51.
29. Dr. K. F. Yusuf, (ed.), op cit., 235.
30. Waheed-uz-Zaman, op cit., p. 7.
31. Matlubul Hassan Syed, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah a Politician*, Second Edition. Lahore, 1953, p. 119.
32. Hector Bolitto, *Jinnah the Creator of Pakistan*, London, 1954, p. 83.
33. Waheed-uz-Zaman, op. cit., p. 8.
34. Ibid.
35. Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, London, 1936, p. 64.
36. Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, London, 1964, p. 306.
37. Waheed-uz-Zaman, op. cit., p. 10.
38. Durga Das, *India: From Nehru and After*, London, 1969, p. 76.
39. P. Moon, *Divide and Quit*, California, 1962, p. 270.
40. Subhas Chandra Bose, *The Indian Struggle 1920-1942*, Bombay, 1964, p. 293.
41. Dr K. F. Yusuf,(ed.), op. cit., p. 97.
42. Hector Bolitto, op. cit., p. 89.
43. *The New York Times*, November 10, 1927.
44. Shariful-Mujahid, *Quaid-i-Azam and his Times: A Compendium*, 1876-1937, Karachi : Vol. I 1978, p. 90.
45. M. H. Syed, op. cit., p. 169.
46. Saleem M.M. Qureshi, op. cit., p. 36.
47. Stanley Walpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1989, p. 312.
48. Hector Bolitto, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
49. Saleem M.M. Qureshi, op. cit., p. 37.
50. *Indian Round Table Conference Proceedings*, Calcutta, 1931, p. 137.
51. Jamiluddin Ahmed, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. 1, p. 39.
52. Ahmed Hassan Dani, (ed.) op. cit., p. 120.
53. Stanley, Reed and Francis Low, *The Indian Yearbook 1936-1937*, Bombay, p. 743.

54. G. Allana, *Ak Qaun Ki Surguzashi*, Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, n.d. pp.257-258. And M. H Syed, op. cit., p. 252.
55. Dr. K. F. Yusuf, (ed.) op. cit., p. 99
56. Ibid.
57. Ahmed Hassan Dani, (ed.) op. cit., p. 123.
58. Jamil-ud-din Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 123-124.

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as the First Governor General of Pakistan

IQTIDAR KARAMET CHEEMA

The establishment of Pakistan was a momentous occasion for the Muslims of the sub-continent. On August 14, 1947, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah took oath as the first Governor General of the Dominion of Pakistan with specific executive powers entrusted to him by the British Crown. He was President of Muslim League and as such was leader of the biggest political party. As President of the Constituent Assembly he headed the Central Legislature.¹ He delegated the duties of the last named office to the Deputy President.² The clauses giving discretionary powers and special responsibility to the Governor General were entirely deleted from the interim Constitution. Yet the Quaid-i-Azam wielded a prodigious authority as the founder of the State.³

From the very first day the Quaid-i-Azam, as the Governor General had to shoulder the major portion of central as well as provincial administrative responsibility. The central administrative institutions grew up under the direct guidance of Quaid-i-Azam. There was a constant search for capable administrators and for ministerial appointments. It was for Quaid-i-Azam to decide whether he should allocate work among his old colleagues or followers or whether he should select his team on merit. From the appointments Jinnah made during his tenure of Governor Generalship it is evident that he chose the latter alternative. His capacity to withstand influence of any kind was extremely great and in national consideration he followed no principle other than service and ability.⁴

The first cabinet of Pakistan was the creation of Quaid-i-Azam. According to the Gazette Notification No: G. G. O/2 of 14 August 1947 the first cabinet of Pakistan took oath of office on August 15, 1947. It included the following members.

Iqtidar Karamet Cheema, Honorary Research Apprentice, Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore. It has been prepared under the supervision of Syed Qamar Abbas, Chairman, Department of History, University of the Punjab.

1. Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan—Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and Minister for Common Wealth Relations.
2. Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigarh—Minister for Trade, Industry and Construction.
3. Malik Ghulam Mohammad—Finance Minister.
4. Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar—Transport and Communication Minister.
5. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan—Minister for Food, Agriculture and Health.
6. Jugindarnath Mandal—Minister for Law and Labour.
7. Fazal-ur-Rehman—Interior Minister and Minister for Information and Education.⁵

The problems and difficulties during the first few months after the establishment of Pakistan were of such magnitude and complexity that cabinet Ministers felt themselves helpless and looked up to the Quaid-i-Azam to guide them with his knowledge, experience and competence in order to tackle the problems and pull them out of difficulties. But the Quaid made it clear that he, as constitutional Governor General, could not interfere with Ministerial responsibilities and actions. The cabinet, therefore, passed a special resolution authorizing the Quaid-i-Azam to take action to deal with emergent problems.⁶ Hence the Quaid-i-Azam not only took the initiative in cabinet making but also in formulation of the policies that the cabinet was to carry out. He presided over its regular meetings as well as the meetings of its emergency committee of which he was also the chairman.⁷ He even called and conducted cabinet meetings in the absence of Prime Minister. He created the Ministry of State and Frontier Regions and Ministry of Evacuee and Refugees Rehabilitation, the former being controlled by the Quaid-i-Azam himself. To add momentum to its creation, the press communiqué noted that "The affairs of the new Ministry will be under the direct control and guidance of Mr. Jinnah."⁸

The Quaid-i-Azam was much more than a mere titular head of the state. In a sense, he was his own Prime Minister, giving advice and taking decisions till the end of his life. A year after independence, Liaquat Ali Khan publicly admitted; "Now that we have got Pakistan, he has not ceased to guide the destinies of the nation. We pray that we may have the benefits of his guidance for a long time to come."⁹

The Quaid-i-Azam impressed upon his government officials that he expected efficient service from them. He reminded them that although they had achieved Pakistan, they must not slacken in their efforts to build and strengthen the new young state. Quaid-i-Azam in an address to a gathering of the civil officers on February 14, 1948 at Sibi said:

"Gentleman, Pakistan is now a sovereign state. You all know that we are starting from scratch. This burden has come upon us. It is a terrific burden and if you want to make Pakistan a great country, you must forget, as far as possible, your pleasures and tea parties and cocktails and put in as much time and as much work as you can in the job which is entrusted to you."¹⁰

As Governor General, Quaid-i-Azam had his eyes on every aspect of the structure of Pakistan, particularly the vulnerable parts. The affairs of the North Western Frontier Province soon invited the attention of the Quaid-i-Azam. In N.W.F.P., Dr. Khan Sahib's Congress Ministry was still in office on August 15, 1947. The Quaid-i-Azam wanted the loyal co-operation of all citizens, regardless of political differences in the past, for the gigantic task of building Pakistan. No one was to be victimized for having opposed the establishment of Pakistan. In keeping with this policy, Dr. Khan Sahib and his ministers would have been allowed to continue in office, but they refused to salute Pakistani flag.¹¹ They also refused to take the new oath of loyalty to Pakistan¹² and showed no sign of change in their previous attitude of antagonism to Pakistan. Therefore on August 22, 1947, the Governor of N.W.F.P. dismissed Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry on the order of Quaid-i-Azam and Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan became the Chief Minister. After the dismissal of Dr. Khan Sahib's Ministry, his brother Abdul Ghaffar Khan continued his activities for the creation of a separate Pathan state. The Governor reported to Quaid-i-Azam that Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other "Red Shirt" leaders were busy in making hostile speeches and hoisting the flag of Pakhtunistan in public meetings.¹³ Consequently Ghaffar Khan was arrested and promptly sentenced to three years imprisonment under the Frontier Crimes Regulations.¹⁴ In April 1948 the Quaid-i-Azam undertook long and arduous journey to the N.W.F.P. In a public speech in Peshawar on April 20, 1948 he warned the people of a grave national emergency that existed both internally and externally and advised them to avoid domestic controversies, petty quarrels and provincialism.¹⁵ He advised the people not to believe in new mushroom like political parties organized by erstwhile anti Pakistan elements.¹⁶

An instance of the Quaid-i-Azam's dislike of inefficiency and apathy in high places was the dismissal of Mohammad Ayub Khuro, the Chief Minister of Sindh. The tremendous influx of refugees into West Pakistan made it imperative that all provinces should play their part in the task of rehabilitating these unfortunate people. But the Government of Sindh showed regrettable reluctance to help the refugees.¹⁷ It was also reported that serious differences had arisen between the Chief Minister and Governor of Sindh. The matter was, however, reported to the Quaid-i-Azam. The Governor of Sindh placed before Quaid-i-Azam the evidence of maladministration and corruption on the part of Khuro,¹⁸ the Chief Minister of Sindh. Considering these two disturbing factors, the Quaid-i-Azam suggested that the Chief Minister of Sindh should tender his resignation as a face saving gesture. Khuro refused to resign and Quaid-i-Azam had no alternative but to instruct the then Governor of Sindh to dismiss him from the office.¹⁹ Therefore, under direction of the Quaid-i-Azam, who was determined to root out all such evils in Pakistan, the Governor dismissed the Chief Minister on April 26, 1948.²⁰ This incident was a solid example of the Quaid's ability to act swiftly when circumstances demanded it.

Quaid-i-Azam was dissatisfied with the way the administration of Punjab was being conducted by the Chief Minister Nawab Mamdot. The Punjab cabinet, instead of working as a united team presented a spectacle of potty squabbles, sordid intrigues, and all other accompaniments of an internecine war between factions.²¹ In addition, Mamdot, Premier of the Punjab, had never had any experience in administration. He was not very hardworking and disciplined in his habits. Daultana, the highly ambitious and brilliant Finance Minister, on the other hand, was against the easy going Chief Minister, the Nawab Mamdot. The Muslim League Party in the Punjab Legislature was split in to two factions consisting of the followers of Mamdot and Daultana. High officials started taking sides. When the Quaid-i-Azam came to know of these feuds, he in April 1948, summoned the Governor along with Mamdot, Daultana and Shaukat Hayat Khan to Karachi to sort out the ministerial tangle.²² At this meeting the Governor General said that since he had found Mamdot to be totally unfit to be the Chief Minister of Punjab, he had decided that Mamdot must resign and that Daultana should take his place.²³ Daultana, however, suggested that it would be better if he got himself elected to that post by the party. After this episode, Quaid-i-Azam lost interest in the matter and probably wanted to wait until the situation warranted him

to take a stern action. The Governor of Punjab who had been asked by Quaid-i-Azam to bring the resignations of his two ministers with him to the meeting, was advised to return. The ministers were delighted to have their resignations turned back but were puzzled and alarmed as to what further course of action Quaid-i-Azam was likely to take.²⁴ Soon afterwards Daultana and Shaukat Hayat Khan resigned and Mamdot formed his second ministry.

Baluchistan was not a full fledged province and had no elected assembly or ministers. It was administrated by the Quaid-i-Azam himself through a chief commissioner appointed by him.²⁵ The Quaid was keenly interested in the progress of Baluchistan, which in many ways was the most backward area of Pakistan. The Quaid-i-Azam, therefore, in a spirit of democratic and political advancement, took the unique step of making the governance and administration of Baluchistan more directly the concern of the Governor General himself. Announcing his decision to appoint an advisory committee the Quaid said :

"I did not want to wait for the requisite legal and statutory provisions to be exacted in their full forms. All that will naturally come in time. For the present, however I have come to the conclusion that our immediate object can best be achieved by making the governance and administration of Baluchistan more directly the concern of Governor General acting in collaboration with the acknowledged representatives of the people of Baluchistan."²⁶

On February 14, 1948 the annual *Darbar* was held at Sibbi. Tribal Chiefs of Baluchistan and representatives of the people of Baluchistan assembled there in large numbers. Quaid-i-Azam took the opportunity of attending it as himself in order, to fulfill his earnest desire of associating the people of Baluchistan with their own administration.²⁷

On June 15, 1948 when the Quaid-i-Azam went once again to Baluchistan he received a great ovation from the people. Replying to an address of welcome from the Quetta Municipality, the Quaid-i-Azam said, "Baluchistan is the land of brave people, independent people, therefore, national freedom, honour and strength should have a special meaning. We are now all Pakistanis not Baluchis, Pathans, Sindhis, Bangalis, Punjabis and so on ... And as Pakistanis we must feel, behave and act, and we should be proud to be known as Pakistanis and nothing else."²⁸

Towards the end of his life, Quaid-i-Azam assumed the responsibility for the newly created "Ministry of States and Tribal Affairs". His memorable achievement in this sphere was the smooth settling of the question of secession of the huge border state of Kalat. It has been reported that the Khan of Kalat wanted to stake a claim of independence. He employed an Englishman, Douglas Fell as his Foreign Minister. It was reported that Douglas Fell was negotiating with foreign companies for oil prospecting and was, possibly seeking support through them. It was also alleged that the Khan's uncle and brother sought aid from Kabul. Negotiations for accession dragged on, though the Khan himself professed highest veneration for the Quaid-i-Azam. Meanwhile the rulers of Lesbela, Makran and Kharan, over whom the Khan of Kalat, claimed some sort of suzerainty, got restive and decided early in March 1948, to offer accession directly to Pakistan. The acceptance of the accession isolated Kalat, now entirely surrounded by Pakistan territory. Under these circumstances the Khan of Kalat saw the path of wisdom and acceded to Pakistan before the end of March, 1948.²⁹

From the earliest beginnings of Pakistan, East Pakistan felt isolated from West Pakistan and therefore it was suggested that some of the sessions of the Assembly should be held in Dacca. Supporting this suggestion Begum Shaista Suharwardy Ikaramullah said, "a feeling is growing that East Pakistan is being neglected and treated merely as a colony, of West Pakistan."³⁰

But as every part of Pakistan was close to Quaid-i-Azam's heart and when he learnt that the people of East Pakistan had a feeling of isolation, he made up his mind to visit the province in spite of his weak health. He addressed a number of record public gatherings and also spoke over the radio. In his speeches which went deep into the hearts of people he dealt with numerous problems faced by East Pakistan and succeeded in diverting public thought and feelings to constructive channels. He told them, "Do not feel isolated. Many people have spoken to me that East Pakistan feels isolated from the rest of Pakistan. No doubt there is a great distance separating East Pakistan from the West Pakistan; no doubt there are difficulties; but I tell you that we fully know and realize the importance of Dacca and East Pakistan. I have only come here for a week or ten days this time in order to discharge my duties as Head of the State. I may have to come here and stay for days, for weeks, and similarly the ministers of Pakistan must establish closer contacts with East Pakistan."³¹

At a public meeting in Dacca held on 21st March 1948, he warned, thus : "As long as you do not throw off this Poison (Provincialism) from our body politics, you will never be able to weld yourself, mould yourself, galvanize yourself into a real true nation."³²

However, so compelling was the Quaid-i-Azam's sincerity and logic that before his tour had ended, harmonious relation between East and West Pakistan were completely restored. He stabilized the conditions in East Pakistan and made it feel that it had an honoured place in the future of Pakistan.

Another controversy, that the Quaid-i-Azam was called upon to decide was the opposition of Sindhi leaders to the contemplated move of Central Government to make Karachi the capital city of Pakistan. The Sindh Assembly passed on 2nd February 1948, a resolution opposing the contemplated move of the Central Government to remove the city of Karachi from the control of Sindh administration and place it under its own immediate jurisdiction as a centrally administrated area.³³

Sindhis, in general, and Sindh Government in particular, were opposed to the transfer of the administrative control of Karachi.³⁴

However, the Quaid-i-Azam stepped in as a mediator. He met a deputation from Sindh Muslim League Assembly Party and discussed the matter freely and fully. With his quick and logical mind, he smoothed out difficulties, cleared up confused impressions and straightened out distorted facts. He explained that the fears of the people of Sindh were groundless and that they had no cause to feel apprehensive that the proposed change over of Karachi would prove detrimental to their interests. Indeed, it would have quite the opposite effects and would have immense benefit to the people of Sindh.³⁵

Karachi was declared the capital of Pakistan by the Governor General's order on 23rd July 1948,³⁶ and the people of Sindh, having implicit faith in the Quaid-i-Azam's judgement accepted calmly the proposed separation of Karachi from Sindh. Once again the Quaid-i-Azam's wisdom and patience had averted a crisis which might have had grave consequences.

Quaid-i-Azam as Governor General requested and the British Government agreed, that a number of their officers should remain in Pakistan to create the armed services, to be Governors of provinces and administrative officials in the government. Quaid-i-Azam appointed experienced British officials as Governors of three out of four provinces, as permanent secretaries of four of the federal ministries, and in many other senior positions. British officers were also retained as heads of the Army, Navy and Air Force.³⁷ When Quaid-i-Azam died, the Military secretaries to the Governor General were British officers. Quaid-i-Azam said to General Sir Douglas Gracey : "Ten years is the limit, I have fixed for asking the British officers to stay."³⁸ Quaid-i-Azam knew exactly what he required from each of these British officers. It is obvious that he wanted experienced and strong officials.

The Quaid-i-Azam desired rapid economic progress of Pakistan. He was fully aware of economic backwardness and poor economic position of Pakistani nation. When we discuss the economic views of Quaid-i-Azam certain questions come to lips after their appearance in our mental horizon. What were his views regarding the development of industry and commerce? Was he a supporter of the Western economic theory and practice or did he advocate the adoption of socialization based on the Islamic concepts of equality and social justice?

Quaid-i-Azam was the first to proclaim that Pakistan would be based on the foundations of social justice and Islamic values which emphasized equality and brotherhood of man.³⁹ Therefore, he had aspired to do away with the obvious manifestations of gross social inequality through making Pakistan a welfare state. He did not want Pakistan to become a paradise of capitalists and landlords.⁴⁰

Quaid-i-Azam fully realized that there was no place for capitalism in Islamic society. Accordingly, he opposed the adoption of Western capitalist economic system in Pakistan. In his speech at the opening ceremony of the State Bank of Pakistan on 1st July 1948, he proclaimed :

"The adoption of Western economic theory and practice will not help us in achieving our goal of creating a happy and contented people. We must work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice."⁴¹

Quaid-i-Azam laid down a golden rule for the future economic policies of Pakistan by remarking that "there would be ample for revenues from equitable taxation levied in a manner consistent with social justice to finance good government and allow us to have a state as good as any in the world and better than many sovereign countries on the map of the world."⁴²

Stating his personal views as to the industrial policy of Pakistan, the Quaid-i-Azam said, "Personally I believe that in these modern days essential key industries ought to be controlled and managed by the state."⁴³

It is thus clear that Quaid-i-Azam stood for two fundamental principles regarding the economic organization of the state—equitable taxation in conformity with principles of social justice and nationalization of key industries and public utility services.

Quaid-i-Azam felt very deeply for the people groaning under the dead weights of landlordism and capitalism. He wanted the landlords and capitalists to read the sign of the time. It is, therefore, evident that Quaid-i-Azam desired a radical change in the agrarian system and capitalistic economy, a change which could prevent the exploitation of millions of tillers of land and the labourers to enable them to lead a life of security and prosperity.⁴⁴

More manifest was his personal interest in industry. With a quick industrial development, he believed, Pakistan would be less dependent on the outside world, provide more employment and increase its own resources. Speaking at the foundation stone laying ceremony of Valika Textile Mills Ltd. Karachi on September 27, 1947 he said, "If Pakistan is to play its proper role in the world to which its size, manpower and resources entitle it, it must develop industrial potential side by side with its agriculture and give its economy an industrial bias. By industrializing our state, we shall decrease our dependence on the out side world for necessities of life."⁴⁵

In respect of commerce and trade, the Quaid-i-Azam preached that the traders of Pakistan must maintain the Islamic standards of honesty. In his address to Karachi Chamber of Commerce, on 27th April 1948, he said, "commerce, gentlemen, is more international than culture and it behoves you to behave in such a way that the power and prestige of Pakistan would be an effective instrument in the establishment and maintenance of high standards of business integrity and practice."⁴⁶

Ever since its establishment the basic aim of Pakistan's foreign policy has been peace at home and abroad and friendship towards all nations of the world. In his broadcast speech to the people of United States of America in February 1948, the Quaid said :

"Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We don't cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation."⁴⁷

Despite her best efforts and wishes Pakistan did not have friendly relations with Afghanistan, the only country which opposed her entry in the United Nations.⁴⁸ At the time of her establishment, the Afghan Government urged the tribes on Pakistani side of the Durand line to rise and create an independent "Pathanistan". It also tried to win over their sympathies through all kinds of methods and propaganda. In this respect she was given full backing by India, which wanted to divert the attention of tribes from Kashmir.⁴⁹

Despite all this Quaid-i-Azam made every endeavor to establish friendly relations with Afghan Government. He stationed his personal representatives at Kabul.⁵⁰ Replying to the speech by Sardar Najibullah Khan, the special representative of the Afghan King in Pakistan at the time of presenting his credentials on 3rd December, 1947, the Quaid-i-Azam remarked, "The Government and people of Pakistan entertain nothing but feelings of warmest friendship toward the Muslim Kingdom of Afghanistan which is our closest neighbour and with whom for many centuries and for many generations the people of Pakistan have had countless religious, cultural relations and I hope that the two Governments will soon be able to settle and adjust, in a spirit of good will for the benefit of both."⁵¹

The Afghan Government did not, however, respond to these gestures of friendship and Islamic brotherhood and refused to give up her hostile attitude. But Pakistan refrained herself from retaliating and exhibited remarkable forbearance despite grave provocations on the part of Afghan Government.

On the eve of assuming his office as Governor General, while commenting on the usefulness and ideals of Commonwealth, Quaid-i-Azam stated :

"Such voluntary and absolute transfer of power and rule by one nation to the other is unknown in the whole history of the world. It is

the translation and realization of the great ideal of Commonwealth which now has been effected and hence both Pakistan and Hindustan have remained the members of Commonwealth, which shows truly that we appreciate the high and noble ideal by which the Commonwealth has been and will be guided in the future.”⁵²

While speaking to Mr. Robert Stimson, B.B.C. correspondent on December 19, 1947, Quaid-i-Azam further elaborated, “Personally I have no doubt that Pakistan will be ready to stay in the Commonwealth, and that Great Britain should exercise the great moral responsibilities she has, as the senior member of the Commonwealth.”⁵³ The Quaid-i-Azam added :

“At the moment I feel Great Britain is treating Pakistan with indifference. I fully realize that Britain has no power to intervene in the affairs of any Dominion, but at the same time Britain and other Dominions are in a position to use moral persuasion to settle differences between the members of Commonwealth. It appears to me that His Majesty’s Government is so far shirking its responsibility in this respect.”⁵⁴

In October 1947, Quaid-i-Azam appealed to Britain and Commonwealth to use their influence in restoring order in embattled Punjab and also invited neutral observers. The reply from Britain was not satisfactory. At about the same time the British supreme commander upon whom Pakistan had heavily depended for ensuring the dispatch of her fair share of the war material from the stores of undivided India was withdrawn, leaving most of his task uncompleted.⁵⁵ But Quaid-i-Azam continued to improve and strengthen relations with various members of Commonwealth in order to plead his country’s cause as vigorously as he could.

India had automatically inherited the membership of various International agencies after independence from the British rule. Pakistan, therefore, immediately after its establishment, put up an application for the membership of the United Nations so that it could participate in the General Assembly’s session, which was to be held in the following month. Pakistan was, therefore, formally admitted into the United Nations on the 30th of September, 1947, at an impressive ceremony in which delegations of all the principal countries of the world participated.⁵⁶

Sir Zafarullah Khan was appointed as the personal envoy of Quaid-i-Azam to the United Nations to argue the case of Palestinian Arabs.⁵⁷ Quaid-i-Azam firmly believed in the ideals and principles for which United Nations had come in to existence. Addressing the officers of I.M.P.S "Dilawar", Karachi, January 23, 1948 he said:

"Pakistan which has been recently admitted to the United Nations Organization will do everything in its power to strengthen the organization and help in the achievement of the ideals which have been set up as its goal."⁵⁸

Under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam, Pakistan took active part in the deliberations and activities of the U.N.O. and other international organizations. Pakistan took part in a number of important international conferences. A delegation was sent to Canberra to attend the conference considering the Japanese peace settlements. Pakistan was also represented at the FAO conference in Geneva. Pakistan representatives took part in an important trade and employment conference. Pakistan also joined other international organizations and agencies such as the F.A.O., I.L.O., W.H.O. the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.⁵⁹

Quaid-i-Azam wished to establish cordial relations with the United States of America. He expressed this desire while replying to the speech by the first Ambassador of U.S.A. on 26th February, 1948, in the following words:

"I cordially share your pleasure as the evidence of friendship and sympathy shown by your country in opening diplomatic relations with Pakistan from the very first day of its establishment as a new state. I would like to add that this friendship has been diligently and consistently furthered".⁶⁰

Quaid-i-Azam wanted to establish a strong and effective Islamic bloc consisting of all Muslim states of the world and to see that all the Muslims of the world united under the banner of Islam as an effective bulwark against the aggressive and evil designs of their enemies.⁶¹

Quite naturally, Quaid-i-Azam took keen interest in Muslim people's cause of freedom and independence. He vehemently opposed the

partition of Palestine and condemned the establishment of Israel as a dagger in the heart of the Arab world.⁶² While answering to a newsman's question on October 25, 1947, he observed :

"I do still hope that the partition plan will be rejected, otherwise there is bound to be the gravest disaster and unprecedented conflict. The entire Muslim world will revolt against such a decision. Pakistan will have no other course left but to give its fullest support to the Arabs and will do what ever lies in its power to prevent what, in my opinion, is an outrage."⁶³

Quaid-i-Azam gave open support to North African Arabs in their struggle to throw off the French yoke. He considered the Dutch attack on Indonesia in 1948, as an attack on Pakistan itself and refused transit facilities to Dutch ships and planes carrying war materials to Indonesia. He played an important role in the liberation struggle of the Muslim countries. He, therefore, provided all possible diplomatic and material assistance to the liberation movements in Indonesia, Malaya, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Nigeria and Algeria.⁶⁴

The relations between India and Pakistan, since the partition of 1947, have been characterized by extreme tensions almost all the time. Economic blockade on one occasion, periodic threats of war and continuous ideological and political warfare have produced, to put it mildly, a shambles in the relationship between these two countries.⁶⁵

Complete antipathy to Pakistan has been the pivot of India's foreign policy, where as the main aim of the Quaid-i-Azam's Government was to follow a policy of goodwill and friendliness towards India. On August 15, 1947, as the first Governor General of Pakistan, he declared "we want to live peacefully and maintain cordial relations with our immediate neighbours and with the world at large."⁶⁶

In his message to Hindustan, the Quaid-i-Azam said : "The past must be buried and let us start afresh as two independent sovereign states of Hindustan and Pakistan."⁶⁷ Soon after the partition of India it became apparent that the Indian leaders had never fully reconciled themselves to the creation of Pakistan. They have indicated on many occasions that partition of India was merely a temporary division, and hopes have often been expressed in India that seceding areas would beg for reunion. The Congress President, Acharya Kripalani said : "Let us henceforth bend all our energies to the unification of this land of ours."⁶⁸

Mr. Nehru expressed the hope thus : "We expected that partition would be temporary, and that Pakistan was bound to come back to us."⁶⁹

Michael Brecher wrote : "Most of the Congress leaders and Nehru among them, subscribed to the view that Pakistan was not a viable state Politically, economically or militarily and that sooner or later the areas which had seceded would be compelled by force of circumstances to return to the fold."⁷⁰ The natural result of this attitude of Indian leaders was that many Pakistanis had real fears about India's ultimate aim of reuniting the subcontinent.

Quaid-i-Azam, in an interview with Reuter's correspondent Mr. Duncan Hoper, which he gave on October 25, 1947 said, "Pakistan has come to stay and will stay. We must try to stop any effort or attempt which is intended to bring about a forced union of the two dominions."⁷¹

India-Pakistan relations since 1947 have pivoted mainly on the issue of Kashmir. However, at that time there were rumors in the State that the Maharaja would accede Kashmir to India, but the majority of the population of Kashmir was in favour of accession to Pakistan. But the Maharaja's personal interests and those of ruling Hindu elite demanded accession to India. The Maharaja of Kashmir played the trick of entering into a stand-still agreement with Pakistan on August 15, 1947 obviously with no intention to abide by it a minute longer than it suited his purpose.

The trouble began in Kashmir in August 1947. When on August 26, 1947, the State troops opened fire on a meeting held by Muslims at Bagh in Poonch District and killed many of them.⁷² Conditions took a serious turn when in Jammu 273,000 Muslims were systematically exterminated until some of them escaped to Pakistan. This border operation by all the forces of the Dogra state was headed by Maharaja in person.⁷³

By the middle of October the Poonch revolt started receiving unofficial support from their friends in Pakistan from whom they were separated only by the river Jehlum. On October 15, 1947, the Maharaja wired to the Governor General of Pakistan suggesting an impartial inquiry, signifying rather ominous warning: If, unfortunately, this request is not heeded, the Government of Kashmir, much against its wishes, will have no option but to ask for assistance to withstand aggressive and unfriendly action of the Pakistani people along our border.⁷⁴

The reference obviously was to the assistance of India. The Quaid-i-Azam in his telegraphic reply on October 20, 1947, requested the Maharaja to send the Prime Minister of Kashmir to Karachi for discussion in order to sort out difficulties and adjust matters in a friendly way.⁷⁵

On 26th October, 1947, the Maharaja applied to India for accession and sought military aid to crush the Muslim uprising. The Government of India immediately dispatched Armed forces to occupy the greater part of the state. The fraudulently sought accession of Kashmir to India and its forced occupation by the Indian troops were acts of gravest provocation but Quaid-i-Azam's Government decided to meet provocation with conciliation. Immediately after the occupation of Kashmir by the Indian army, a conference between the Governor General and Prime Minister of Pakistan and India was arranged in Lahore at the instance of Quaid-i-Azam. Unfortunately this meeting could not be held owing to Nehru's illness and Sardar Patel's reluctance to talk with the Pakistani leaders. A meeting at last took place between Quaid-i-Azam and Mountbatten on November 1, 1947 at Lahore.

Quaid-i-Azam put forward a three-point proposal for the settlement of dispute :

1. Ceasefire within forty eight hours.
2. The Indian forces as well as the tribesmen were to withdraw from Kashmir.
3. The two Governor Generals should be vested with full powers to restore peace, undertake the administration of the state and arrange for a plebiscite under their joint control and supervision.⁷⁶

Mountbatten pleaded his inability to accept the proposals without the consent of Indian cabinet. These proposals were, however, brushed aside by India. In January 1948, Kashmir dispute was brought before Security Council. The turn of events in Kashmir had an adverse effect on Quaid-i-Azam's health. He felt deceived and his early optimism gave way to deep disappointment.⁷⁷

As Governor General, Quaid-i-Azam attached great importance to education. Hence Quaid-i-Azam desired that the educational policy of Pakistan be brought on the lines suited to the genius of the nation,

consonant with its history and culture, and having regard to the modern needs and requirements. In a message to All Pakistan Educational Conference held at Karachi on 27th November 1947, he wrote:

"There is no doubt that the future of our state will and must greatly depend upon the type of education. There is immediate and urgent need for training our people in the scientific and technical education in order to build up our future economic life. We have to build up the character of our future generations which means highest sense of honour, integrity, selfless service to the nation."⁷⁸

Quaid-i-Azam in his position as Governor General devoted his attention to the eradication of corruption, bribery and nepotism, which were inherited by the administration as a legacy from the old regime. He urged the people to fight these social evils. In his very first speech in the Constituent Assembly, he declared, "One of the biggest curses from which India is suffering is bribery and corruption, that really is a poison. We must put that down with an iron hand, Evils of nepotism and jobbery must be crushed relentlessly."⁷⁹

Quaid-i-Azam was almost seventy-two years old when Pakistan came into existence and yet he continued to fulfill all his obligations earnestly and efficiently. The burden of work was increasing despite his ever failing health. Quaid-i-Azam had become very weak. A medical board was constituted for the treatment of Quaid-i-Azam and on July 14, 1948 he was shifted to Ziarat. Even in those days, he did not remain indifferent to his official duties. For one hour daily he used to examine the files. He gave his last message to the nation on the occasion of the first Anniversary of Pakistan on August 14, 1948, in which he said:

"Today we are celebrating the first Anniversary of our freedom. One year is a brief period in the history of a state for finally assessing its progress or predicting the future. But the way in which tremendous difficulties have been overcome and solid progress recorded during the last twelve months gives a firm basis for optimism. Nature has given you everything, so go ahead! Pakistan Zindabad."⁸⁰

On 11th September, 1948 at 10.25 p.m. Quaid's soul departed from this world. He was the Father of the Nation, the Quaid-i-Azam, the great leader. He was simultaneously the Governor General of Pakistan and

President of her Constituent Assembly. Alas! within less than thirteen months of having won our long cherished freedom, he passed away, leaving behind a legacy to the Pakistanis in the form of his principles and ideals. His commanding face disappeared for ever. With his death the nation had lost a truly great man and it was not possible to fill the void created by his sad demise.

REFERENCES

1. Wilber, *Pakistan Yesterday and Today*, New York 1964, p.120
2. I.H. Qureshi, *A Short History of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1967, p.229
3. *The Journal of History and Political Science 1971-72*, Lahore, p.49
4. Matlub-ul-Hussain Saiyad, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah: A Political Study*, Lahore, 1953, p.453
5. Zawar Hussain Zaidi, *Jinnah Papers* Islamabad, 2000 Vol V, p. xxvii
6. Jamil-ud-din Ahmed, *Glimpses of Quaid-i-Azam*, Karachi, 1960 p. 55
7. Mushtaq Ahmed, *Government and Politics of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1963, p. 23
8. Wayne Aryes Wilcox, *Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation*, New York, 1963 p.96
9. Mushtaq Ahmed, *op.cit.* p.24
10. *Eastern Times*, February 15, 1948,
11. Ch. Mohammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, New York, p.251
12. Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan the Formative Phase*, Karachi, 1960, p.260
13. *Ibid*, p.244
14. *Ibid*, p.248
15. *DAWN*, April 21, 1948
16. *Pakistan Times*, April 21, 1948.
17. R.M. White, *The Great Leader: Quaid-i-Azam*, Lahore, 1962, p.118
18. Ch. Mohammad Ali, *op.cit.* p.368
19. R.M. White, *op.cit.* p.119
20. Ch. Mohammad Ali, *op.cit.* p.368
21. *Ibid*, p.369
22. *Ibid*, p.367
23. K.B. Sayeed, *op.cit.* p.268
24. *Ibid*, pp.268-269
25. M.H. Saiyid, *op.cit.* pp.459-460
26. *Pakistan Times*, February 15, 1948.
27. *Eastern Times*, February 17, 1948.
28. Khurshid Ahmed Khan, *Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam*, Lahore, 1996 Vol. IV, p. 2784
29. Ch. Mohammad Ali, *op.cit.* p.236
30. K.B. Sayeed, *op.cit.* p.275
31. *Eastern Times*, March 24, 1948.
32. Khurshid Ahmed Khan, *op.cit.* p.2717
33. Ch. Mohammad Ali, *op.cit.* p.236
34. S.M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and Birth of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1970 p.424
35. R.M. White, *op.cit.* p.120-121

36. K.B. Sayeed, op.cit., p.270
37. Richard Symond, *The Making of Pakistan*, Lahore 1970, p.91
38. Ibid. p.199
39. *Pakistan Times*, March 28, 1948.
40. Mushtaq Ahmed op.cit., p.27
41. Khurshid Ahmed Khan ,op.cit., p.2787
42. *Pakistan Times*, March 23, 1974.
43. *Morning News*, September 11, 1969.
44. Ibid.
45. Khurshid Ahmed Khan, op.cit., p.2622
46. Ibid. p.2775
47. Ibid. p.2694
48. Richard Symond, op.cit. p.,167
49. Ian Stephen, *Pakistan Old Country and New Nation*, London., 1967, p. 265
50. Mushtaq Ahmed, op.cit., p.,23
51. Ferozsons Ltd., *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches as Governor General of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1978, p.38
52. Ibid., p.12
53. *The Civil and Military Gazette*, December 20, 1947.
54. Ibid.
55. Richard Symond, op.cit., p.169
56. Syed Qamar-ul-Ahsan, *Birth of Pakistan Step by Step*, Dacca, 1952, p.114
57. Mushtaq Ahmed, op.cit., p.25
58. Khurshid Ahmed Khan, op.cit.,2667
59. Ch. Mohammad Ali, op.cit., p.249
60. Khurshid Ahmed Khan, op.cit., p.2696
61. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, *Quaid-i-Azam as seen by his Contemporaries*, Lahore, 1966, p.239
62. Aziz Beg, *Pakistan and Arab Israel War*, Lahore, 1973, p. xxll
63. Dr. M. Rafique Afzal *Selected Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, Lahore, 1980, p.438
64. Ch. Mohammad Ali, op.cit., p.380
65. G. W. Chaudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India*, London, 1969 p.4
66. Dr. M. Rafique Afzal, op.cit., p.429
67. Ibid., p.428
68. *Statesman*, New Delhi, August 18, 1947
69. M. A. H. Isphani, *Quaid-i-Azam as I Knew Him*, Karachi, 1966, p.274
70. Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography*, New York, 1959, p.377
71. Dr. M. Rafique Afzal, op.cit., p.439
72. Aslam Siddiqui *A Path for Pakistan*, Karachi, 1964, p.55
73. Mushtaq Ahmed Gormani, *Kashmir World's Biggest Question Mark*, p.25
74. Lord Bird Wood, *The Two Nations and Kashmir*, London, 1956, p.50
75. Ibid. p.51
76. *Mah-e-Nao*, November 1965, p.24
77. Ch. Mohammad Ali, op.cit, p/297
78. *DAWN*, September 11, 1949
79. Ferozsons Ltd. op. cit p.7
80. *The Civil and Military Gazette*, August 15, 1948

Basic Sources and Documents of the Freedom Struggle of Muslims of India under the leadership of the Quaid-i-Azam

A Glance at the Material with Special Reference to Muslim Youth and Women

SARFARAZ HUSSAIN MIRZA

INTRODUCTION

In the vast continent of India, Muslims were the rulers before the British established their rule. In order to gain the lost power in 1857, the Muslims started a conscious movement that ultimately led to the establishment of Pakistan in 1947.

The first phase began soon after the 1857 War of Independence. The cause of this movement, documented by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and, later, the speeches he made on the plight of the Muslims and the new course of activity advocated by him was the start of the new struggle in South Asia. In this era, some other prominent Muslims who made vital contributions such as Maulana Altaf Hussain Hali and others need special mention for their rich contributions in the last fifty years of Muslim India in the last century.

The next and most vital phase took its form with the setting up of a political party, the All-India Muslim League in 1906. The basic documents, which tell the rich nature of the struggle which lay ahead, is a rich store house of source material. The contribution of prominent

Sarfراز Hussain Mirza, Centre for South Asian Studies, Quaid-i-Azam Campus, University of the Punjab, Lahore. The author is grateful to Syed Qamar Abbas, Chairman, Department of History, for providing necessary material contained in one of his research articles.

political figures, such as Agha Khan, Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk, Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk and others who lent a helping hand in shaping the Muslim outlook deserve due recognition. The assessment of the related documents determine the early political attitude of Muslims towards their freedom struggle.

With the joining of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, (later Quaid-i-Azam) the League took a different turn. From 1913 onward, the speeches of the Quaid, the emerging new chief architect of the fate of Muslims in South Asia spotlight the new trends of the struggle for Pakistan. Some other prominent Muslim leaders, like Ali Brothers, Maulana Hasrat Mohani and Mian Muhammad Shafi, kindled new light in the hearts of the Muslims for yearning freedom.

Dr. Allama Mohammad Iqbal, a poet-philosopher of the East, made his specific proposals in his Presidential Address at the annual session of the All India Muslim League at Allahabad in 1930. This is very often cited as the one thought which dominated the struggle of Muslims for freedom. This particular document, and others such as "Now or Never" which made similar contribution make it easy to find out the new wind that was blowing and sweeping across the minds of Muslim India for their onward march for independence.

The last phase started with the passing of the Lahore Resolution (Pakistan Resolution) in 1940 when the Muslim League at its mammoth gathering set forth the goal of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. These, then, are the basic documents which tell us about the new revolutionary trends which ultimately triumphed and led to the creation of Pakistan.

This was also the time when the Muslim youth were really attracted to the idea of Pakistan. The Muslim League drew heavily on this new force of both male and female students hailing from almost all the prominent educational institutions. The All-India Muslim Students Federation became the new iron arm of the Muslim struggle for freedom. Why was this decision taken to enlist the support of students, how was it organized and what did it accomplish is a matter of record and a subject for vital study which would be drawn from the documents which are luckily found in abundance and for which a careful selection would suggest the real importance of the students in the struggle for the liberation of Muslim India and the establishment of Pakistan in 1947.

In order to build a real and authentic version of the movement of Pakistan's creation and the role that the students played therein, a documentary evidence is essential. For any historian to know what Pakistan stands for today, it is vital to know how Pakistan came into being and who played the key role. For the Muslim World, this is a vital study and the position of contemporary Pakistan could well be understood with the help of events which shaped it. Though women entered late in the struggle, nonetheless their presence made this great and determined effort a complete political phenomena. The studies of the documents of the period would establish that when the final struggle for freedom was waged everyone took part in it. Pakistan was for everyone and everyone was for Pakistan.

BASIC SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS

The Muslim struggle for freedom in South Asia which started with the avalanche of 1857 and culminated in the establishment of a separate Muslim homeland, Pakistan, undoubtedly constitutes a very unique, striking and remarkable phenomenon of the present century which has already had an immense impact on the contemporary world history.

Various motives and compulsions worked behind it. Growing political consciousness among the Indian Muslims and their increasing apprehensions about their safer future provided the *raison deter* for their political struggle in India. In the origin, growth and development of this great endeavour several forces, organizations, groups and classes of the Muslims played a very significant role. However the role of Muslim Youth in our regeneration and liberation was comparatively more conspicuous, crucial and constructive. They indeed acted as the vanguard of the Pakistan Movement in the 30s and 40s.

Political consciousness among the Muslim Youth, in fact, had developed long before that crucial period of 30s and 40s. No wonder, if we find the Muslim Youth restless and anxious about political convulsions that shook the Muslims both within and without India. The Tripolitania episodes (1911) and the Balkan wars (1912-13) were undoubtedly great politico-military crises over which the Indian Muslims generally were mentally perturbed and they sharply reacted to these crucial developments. The Muslim students in India did not remain behind. They also showed great anxiety. As we know it well the Turks

suffered much at the hands of the Christian powers of Europe during the Tripolitania and Balkan wars. Similarly, immediately after the First World War started in 1914, a considerable number of Muslim students from Lahore Colleges left for Turkey through Afghanistan in order to take part in the *Jihad* (Holy War), that Turkey was waging along with the Central powers including Germany, against the Allies including Britain and France. During the days of *Hijrat* and the *Khilafat* Movements, the Muslim Youth were on the fore front. They also remained alive to other developments of the twenties. But till the end of 20s, the activities of Muslim Youth in the national annals remained of casual nature. However, some sort of their organized activities started with the beginning of the 30s.

By the beginning of 30s we see that the students, both Hindus and Muslims, had started to organize themselves on communal lines. A number of Youth organizations, especially All-India Hindu League and Muslim National Youth League, were working for promoting the interests of their respective communities.

The Inter Collegiate Muslim Brotherhood founded in early 1930s was a purely non-political body of religious-minded Muslim students whose activities were confined only to holding debates and teaching Islamic injunctions to Muslim Youth on weekly basis. This organization published useful literature in which various problems of Muslim Youth were elaborately discussed. In its gatherings, articles on *Islamic Thought* used to be read and suitable ways discussed to keep the Muslim students away from the un-Islamic practices so as to save them from the onslaught of the Hindu community. An important event in the history of the Brotherhood was the splendid reception given to the Grand Mufti of Palestine at Lahore in 1933. In this meeting, addresses were read out in support of the cause of the Palestinians. In his detailed speech the Grand Mufti explained the sufferings of the Palestinians and thanked the Muslim students for arranging such a magnificent welcome in his honour. The Brotherhood gathered momentum and paved the way for the establishment of a number of Muslim Youth organizations all over India in late 1937.

The Muslim students at that juncture of history were politically fully conscious and aware of the socio-political situation which was developing in the sub-continent. The majority community, the Hindu had become increasingly intolerant and aggressive and as a reaction the

Muslim Youth suffered discrimination at the hands of the Hindu students. Realizing the gravity of the situation in late 30s, the Muslim students envisaged the idea of forming a separate Muslim students organization.

Under a separate Muslim Youth Organization they were to take up such crucial matters as *Sree and Padma* crest of the Calcutta University; the *Vidya Mandir* Scheme in the Central Provinces; the anti-Islamic crest of the Nagpur University; singing of the *Vande Matram* and to show veneration to the Congress tri-colour flag in addition to bowing before the pictures of Hindu saints in the Hindu majority provinces. After the formation of a separate Muslim youth organization things began to take a definite shape and prospects of their better settlement became brighter still.

They ably and skillfully handled two important fronts, i.e., Social and Intellectual, by bringing out reading materials in the students' journals and magazines and by establishing study circles for the Muslim masses, especially the Youth. The most important of all these was the *Awakening* which had the Quaid's blessing. The Quaid-i-Azam in a message to its issue of September 1940, made the Muslim Youth realize what their responsibilities were and what they were required to do in the fast changing times. He said :

... Be prepared, the youth of India has a special duty towards the community. They are looked upon as the flower of the nation and correspondingly they have a greater responsibility to shoulder. Besides being the strong arms of their nation they will in turn have to work also as its brain. So they must think, qualify, equip and prepare themselves till the call for action comes. It is only then that you will discharge efficiently your duty and responsibility which may fall upon you with credit and honour to yourself and your people.

The Muslim Youth, who were generally treated as inexperienced, ignorants, irresponsible, ill-informed and even apathetic towards current problems proved to be otherwise, to some extent, because of the Quaid's guidance and encouragement. The young admirers of the Quaid not only obeyed and supported his directives and decisions but also understood his mission very clearly. They became more active and vigorous when the Quaid placed a definite goal for them to achieve, as announced in the League's historic session of March 1940 at Lahore. The students who